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7Introduction
As a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis, a problem of sovereign credit risk hit European
countries. Because of the lack of a common framework to deal with banks crisis, the rescue
operations in their domestic banking sectors made by several countries caused an increase in
the interdependence of banks and sovereigns. These rescue operations caused a transfer of risk
from the banking to the sovereign sector causing a deterioration in the creditworthiness of the
sovereigns. This loss has originated a negative feedback loop between the two entities, credit
risks of banks and sovereign became interconnected such that an increase in one of the two was
mirrored by an increase also in the other one.
The loop originates mainly from the domestic exposures within banks portfolios. A deteriora-
tion of the creditworthiness of the sovereign cause a loss of value of its bonds and so losses in
the balance sheets of the banking sector. These losses cause a reduction in the lending activities
of the banks and so a lower stimulus to the real economy. The consequent contraction in the real
economy causes lower profits in terms of taxation for the sovereign and thus a further decrease
in its creditworthiness thus generating a vicious negative loop.
Several studies have investigated the dynamics under the loop and in particular they have fo-
cused on the financial crisis period in Europe where the effects of the loop has been blamed for
deepening the effects of the crisis and making the recovery even harder. European banks were
caught by the crisis with great exposures to their domestic sovereigns and this created the basis
for the development of the contagion between banks and sovereigns.
In particular the effects of the feedback loop were greater in the so called "periphery countries"
in which the home bias of the banks portfolios was greater.
We decided to find evidences on the presence of a contagion between sovereign and bank-
ing credit risk through the analysis of the 5Y CDS.
First we made a country analysis for Italy by identifying some economic events at the country
level that could have had an influence on the link. We find evidences of the presence of the link
and of its reinforcement as a consequence of banks bailouts in 2016 and 2017. Furthermore, the
link has become stronger especially in the very recent period, after the election of the new gov-
ernment. Political instability has caused in fact both sovereign and banking CDS to increase.
Finally we made a comparison analysis between Italy and Germany, a "periphery" and "core"
country to find evidences of the presence of the contagion and see if there are differences in the
dimension of the phenomenon.
We indeed found the presence of the link also in Germany but here, the strength of the link
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is lower with respect to the Italian case. In both countries the link seems to have been atten-
uated after the use of non conventional monetary policies of the ECB in order to support the
weak economies of the Euro area and especially after the introduction of the Single Resolution
Mechanism which was a further step to a more integrated banking sector in Europe.
In order to present our analysis the work is structured as follows.
The first chapter gives an introduction and a description of the negative feedback loop that orig-
inates form the contagion between the sovereign and the domestic banking sectors of many
countries and of its transmission channels.
Chapter 2 presents the evidences of the contagion especially in Europe during the financial cri-
sis and presents the countries’ and banks’ characteristics that facilitate its development.
The third chapter presents the solution suggested by the literature in order to solve the creation
and the development of the feedback loop.
Finally, Chapter 4 are presents the two analysis with their results. For both analysis we study the
daily change in 5Y CDS of the sovereigns and the banking sectors. We first made a graphical
analysis and then we provide the results of the linear regression analysis and those of the non
linear approach with the use of the quantile regression.
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The Diabolic Loop
Prior to the financial crisis there was no sign of sovereign credit risk in the developed economies
but after 2008 it has become a significant problem for many developed countries, mostly in Eu-
rope.
Due to the absence of a common policy framework for handling the banking crisis and the lack
of a single resolution mechanism, several governments were forced to rescue troubled banks
headquartered in their countries during the financial crisis, especially in Europe. These rescue
operations have increased national debt burdens and caused a deterioration of public finances.
As a consequence, the interdependence of banks and countries has increased causing negative
feedback loops between their financial conditions.
The crisis has further intensified the link between bank and country risk especially in the vulner-
able countries were banks, as major investors in government bonds, are affected by governments
defaulting on their debt through direct losses. Bank bailouts programs changed the composi-
tion of banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and affected the linkage between the default risk
of governments and their local banks thus making the negative sovereign-bank loop one of the
main amplifying factors of distress during the financial crisis of 2008.
1.1 Definition
The aforementioned interdependence between banks and governments is a kind of two-way
negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking risk. This “diabolic loop” has been a
key feature of the global financial crisis, in particular in the vulnerable countries of the periph-
ery of the euro area.
In these countries, the deterioration of the creditworthiness of the governments reduced the
value of the bank’s holding of domestic sovereign debt thus reducing their perceived solvency
and curtailing their lending activity. This resulting distress of banks increased the chances
that banks would have to be bailed out by the domestic government and therefore increasing
the sovereign distress even further, engendering a “bailout loop” (Brunnermeier et al. 2016).
Moreover, the credit crunch led to a reduction in tax revenue which weakened the government
solvency triggering a “real economy loop”.
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FIGURE 1.1: Real economy diabolic loop. Source:Brunnermeier et al. (2016)
The relationship between financial and sovereign credit risks and economic growth is not ac-
cidental but it represents a “tale of two debt overhang problem”. When financial sectors are
undercapitalized, as after the financial crisis, the resulting debt overhang reduces banks’ incen-
tives to provide credit to the real economy and so governments are engaged in financial sector
bailouts. Such bailouts are costly and carry the risk of a “Phyrrhic victory” for the sovereigns
(Acharya et al. (2014)). In fact, bailouts require immediate issuance of additional debt by gov-
ernments in order to stop creditors of distressed or insolvent financial firms. This will increase
the sovereign credit risk through the liabilities side of the balance-sheet. On the other hand, the
sovereign runs the risk of becoming indebted to the point that another debt overhang will occur
in their economy and this will lead to higher taxes in the future and dilutes long-run returns
on real-sector and human-capital investments in the private sector. The under-investment in the
economy can cause a slowdown in growth and productivity in the sovereign thus affecting the
sovereign credit risk through the asset side of the balance sheet.
There is clearly a trade-off between the two debt overhangs and this can cause the sovereign to
sacrifice its creditworthiness in order to alleviate the financial sector overhang. Paradoxically,
the deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness increases the risk that the credit problems
will feed back adversely into its financial sector through the direct holdings of government debt
by the financial sector (home bias) and the creditor guarantees provided by the sovereign.
1.2 Transmission Channels
The “diabolic loop” originates from several factors and then develops itself through different
channels. The main factors that originate the loop have been figured out by Pagano et al. (2016),
who showed that there are three main features to the feedback loops:
• Home bias of bank’s sovereign debt portfolios;
• Inability of governments to commit not to bailout domestic banks;
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• Free capital mobility;
Holdings of domestic sovereign bonds are clearly the main ingredient for the development of
the loop. The importance of bonds for financial institutions is due to the fact that usually long-
term government bonds are used by banks as collateral to short-term loans with which they
cover their liquidity needs. For this reason, the ability of banks to be liquid is strictly connected
with the quality of the bonds they hold and thus with their ratings. The rating of government
bonds is in turn connected with the perception of the strength of the government by interna-
tional investors. So, as long as investors and rating agencies are concerned about the possibility
that the government will not be able to fully pay off its debt, the rating of government bonds
will decline thus affecting the profitability of the financial sector. In fact, the bias in bank’s
portfolios makes their value and solvency strictly dependent on the fluctuations in the perceived
solvency and market value of government debt.
The inability of governments to commit not to bail out domestic banks contribute to the feed-
back from bank to government distress because the bailout is optimal once banks are distressed.
So, if governments decide to rescue troubled domestic banks, there will be a transfer of risk
from banks to the sovereign. Moreover, rating downgrades of government bonds raises doubts
about the ability of a government to save systemic financial institutions from impending insol-
vency.
Finally, the free capital mobility ensures that the market value of domestic government debt re-
flects also the international investor’s perception of future government solvency thus increasing
the influence that the solidity of the government has on the value of sovereign bonds hold by
banks in their portfolios.
As said before, the effects of the “diabolic loop” pass through different channels and more
specifically the feedback is a “two ways” one so there are two different directions. The double
direction of causality goes from the sovereign to the banking and vice versa.
The first direction considered is that from sovereign risk to banking risk and it develops from
three main transmission canals:
• Banks’ balance sheet;
• Ratings of public and private issuers;
• Government’s guarantees;
The transmission through the bank’s balance sheet is a matter of credit risk and in particular it
is related with the excessive exposure to domestic sovereign debt.
As seen before, the deterioration or improvement of the creditworthiness of the government
may cause some losses or gains on the bank’s portfolios of sovereign securities and can also
affects bank’s standing on the loans to the government. The impact of the losses depends on the
way in which the securities are carried on the balance sheet. If they are carried at market value,
a fall in the value of the sovereign bonds has a direct effect on bank’s profit and loss statements.
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It has also an effect on the equity leverage, while if they are reported at amortized cost, the
losses will be reported only when the securities are impaired. On the other hand, this exposes
the bank to some problems in funding conditions prior to the occurring of the impairment and
investors can become concerned about the solidity of the bank.
The bias is due to several factors like hedging motives, legal risk, transaction costs and informa-
tional frictions but the main contribution is given by the current regulations which give claims
on the government preferential treatment over those on private borrowers.
Government bonds are usually used as collateral for short-term loans and so for the liquidity
needs of banks but they are also used to secure wholesale funding from central banks, private
repo market, issuance of covered bonds and to back OTC derivative positions. An increase in
sovereign risk reduces the funding capacity of the banks through the reduction in the availabil-
ity and eligibility of collateral thus reducing the volume of secured loans and as a consequence
short-term refinancing options for banks.
This reduction is transmitted through different mechanisms: first, the value of sovereign bonds
influences directly the value of the collateral pool thus if the former decreases the latter will do
the same. Secondly, if the credit rating of the bonds declines due to some concerns of investors
and rating agencies on the ability of the government to pay off its debt, a haircut will be applied
on refinancing operations of banks and by the ECB in its lending operations to commercial
banks1
Another important point is that national authorities apply reduced risk weights to bank’s claim
on the sovereign where the holding company is incorporated, denominated and founded in the
domestic currency. In Europe for example, partly reflecting Basel II, a zero risk weight is given
to most of the debts issued by EU sovereigns, including those in the euro area. Basel III and
the EU treat government bonds of Member States as risk-free, highly liquid assets and exclude
them from capital requirements and large exposure regimes thus giving an incentive to banks
to hold them in their portfolios. In the light of what has been said before, several studies have
investigated the reasons why banks are so exposed to domestic government bonds. In particu-
lar, Angelini-Grande-Panetta, in a study made for the Bank of Italy, outlined how banks in all
European countries had been virtually reducing their exposures for several years. But in the
fall of 2008, after the Lehman default, they resumed purchases of domestic government bonds.
Usually under normal circumstances banks have no incentive to buy government paper, despite
the preferential treatment the regulations grant to this form of investment, so what the authors
figured out was that the increasing exposures and the home bias of portfolios was a consequence
of the 2008 financial crisis.
Three hypotheses have been advanced on which were the reasons why the crisis triggered the
resurge of the home bias (Battistini et al. (2013)):
• Moral suasion: high risk sovereign issuers may exert “moral suasion” on their domestic
banks to increase their domestic sovereign holdings to support the demand for sovereign
1During Main Refinancing Operations and Long Term Refinancing Operations of the ECB the 20% of opera-
tions is secured by government bonds.
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debt when it is low. In times of fiscal distress governments prompt domestic banks to
purchase additional amounts of domestic sovereign bonds because market demand is low.
The government needs to do this because undersubscribed auctions for sovereign debt
damage governments’ credibility and push sovereign bond yields up, raising debt refi-
nancing costs.
The development of the mechanism of the moral suasion is strictly related to three facts
(Ongena et al. 2016):
– The main determinant of newly issued sovereign debt is the amount of maturing
sovereign debt which the government needs to roll over;
– The amount of retiring government debt is pre-determined because it is the outcome
of choices typically made years before by previous governments;
– Domestic banks are more likely to be “morally swayed” than foreign banks, through
explicit and implicit threats to those banks that decide not to cooperate.
The dimension of the suasion is dependent on the so called distinction between “high
need” and “low need” months (Ongena et al. 2016). The former are those when the
total amount of new debt auctioned by the domestic government is above the country-
specific median for the period because of high refinancing need stemming from a large
amount of maturing debt. In the high need months, the risk of undersubscribed auctions
is greater and also the risk of higher yields. Domestic banks were substantially more
likely to purchase domestically-issued sovereign debt than foreign banks in high need
months. The effect is more pronounced for state-owned banks and for those with initial
holdings of domestic sovereign debt. We can expect the government to strategically picks
the banks it chooses to influence, in particular those that aren’t already saturated with
domestic sovereign debt. Domestic banks are more likely to be influenced because they
are more vulnerable to explicit and implicit threats if they decide not to cooperate. They
also have more to lose in terms of funding costs and so if an auction fails they are more
likely to comply with their government request to buy additional bonds.
• Gambling for resurrection/Carry trade: under-capitalized banks may have “gambled for
resurrection" by engaging in carry trades thus getting cheap liquidity from the ECB and
investing it in high-yielding bonds;
• Comparative advantage/renationalization: in the case of a collapse of the euro, banks’
liabilities will be redenominated into new national currencies and so banks try to hedge
redenomination risk by matching their assets and liabilities at the national level, replacing
foreign assets with domestic ones.
The impact through the balance sheet is not only in terms of credit risk but also in terms of
liquidity and funding risk. Governments bonds are typically used as collateral, therefore a fall
in their price can trigger margin calls or larger haircuts thus reducing the liquidity that can be
obtained via given nominal amount of sovereign paper.
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The second channel of the sovereign-bank dependence hangs on the connection between rat-
ings of public and private issuers. The effect of the ratings works in two ways.
First, due to the rating ceilings, according to which all the major domestic banks are rated at or
below the respective sovereign, usually sovereign downgrades lead to downgrade of domestic
banks.
Secondly, downgrades reduce the value of bank’s liabilities and the loss of investment grade
status can make sovereign ineligible as collateral in funding operations or unsuitable for certain
categories of investors such as pension funds and insurance companies thus affecting costs of
bank’s debt and equity funding. Rating downgrades cause banks to pay higher spreads on their
bond funding and reduce their market access. In addition, institutional investors, restricted to
investment grade bonds, could be forced to liquidate their holdings of bank bonds if the rating
falls below the threshold.
The financial crisis made evident this dependence. In fact, 64% of domestic banks saw their
credit ratings lowered in the six months that followed a sovereign downgrade.
The final channel is that of governments’ guarantees (Leonello 2018) and it is related to the
fact that systemic banks have usually an implicit government guarantee which lowers the cost
of debt funding.
Especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, many government bailout programs consisted
in providing explicit guarantees of no deposit debt as well as various troubled assets. The role
played by guarantees to financial institutions in the emergence of banking and sovereign debt
crisis is due to the link between depositor’s and investor’s withdrawal decisions. In fact, cred-
itor’s rollover decisions and the number of depositors running affect the resources available
to the government and thus the amount of guarantees given. The fewer investors roll and the
more depositors run the larger will be the amount that the government will need to transfer to
the banking sector thus tightening its budget. Sovereign creditors expected repayment will be
lower and the probability of a sovereign default will increase. This complementarity sets the
ground for the negative feedback loop between bank and the sovereign, the increase in the prob-
ability of a sovereign default translates into reduced effectiveness of the guarantees in limiting
instability in the banking sector. Downgrading bonds make government guarantees for individ-
ual institutions or specific liabilities less credible.
Guarantees affect the probability of a banking crisis and a sovereign default in a non-trivial way
because they are beneficial for bank’s stability as they improve the available resources. They
reduce the probability of a banking crisis but they are detrimental for the sovereign solvency
because they represent a disbursement for the government and thus increase the probability of
a sovereign default. The reduction in the probability of a banking crisis due to the guarantees
will improve sovereign stability by reducing transfers of resources to the banking sector.
The direct and the indirect effect work in opposite directions so the overall effect of the guar-
antees can be positive or negative. It is positive when an increase in the guarantees leads to a
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significant reduction in the probability of a banking crisis and to a drop in the probability of a
sovereign default despite the disbursement for the government.
The direction of causality, as we said, can also be reversed; the risk of banks defaults raises
the financing costs of sovereigns and a banking crisis can trigger a surge in sovereign risk. In-
deed, a financial crisis may require the government to support financial institutions. The rating
of a country is strictly connected to the activity of supplying credit because a credit crunch curbs
investments and has a negative impact on growth thus reducing tax revenues. Fear of a credit
supply collapse can push governments to intervene and directly support their domestic banks
through guarantees, capital injections or by buying up loss-making assets.
For all the reasons discussed above it can be seen that once a shock causes a weakening of
the sovereign, or of the banking system, a self-reinforcing feedback loop can easily develop.
Tensions in the sovereign debt market affect banks’ funding conditions thus affecting also do-
mestic households and firms. By weakening the economy, a credit squeeze leads to a decline in
borrowers’ creditworthiness and to further tensions in the sovereign’s situation because of less
fiscal revenues and the need of fiscal tightening. This will result in a depression of the credit
growth with a negative effect on bank’s interest margin and profitability.
1.3 A Model for the Loop
Acharya et al. (2014) developed a model in order to describe the dynamic of the loop. The
model consists of three economic sectors: financial, non-financial and government.
The first two sectors produce aggregate output while the financial sector is leveraged and un-
derinvests due to the debt overhang problem.
By assumption restructuring the financial sector debt is impossible (prohibitively expensive) so
the government may undertake a bailout of the financial sector by a transfer from the rest of the
economy, funded in the future by raising taxation.
To fund the bailout, the government issues new bonds thus alleviating the under provision of
the financial services. Of course the size of the bailout depends on the existing debt because
the greater the debt the lower the ability to undertake the bailout, the so called Laffer curve
property.
Raising taxes in fact has two effects: capturing a greater portion of future value of the non
financial sector but also decreasing the incentive to the non financial sector to invest in future
projects thereby reducing tax revenues. The announcement of the bailout lowers the price of
the government debt causing a collateral damage to the financial sector holdings of the debt.
The combination of high debt overhang and large existing debt cause the underinvestment cost
of fully funding the bailout with tax revenues to be high. As a consequence, the government
should sacrifice its creditworthiness by issuing new debt without a corresponding increase in
tax revenues.
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The government accepts a positive probability of default resulting in a positive relationship be-
tween sovereign’s debt level and credit risk. In this way the financial sector credit risk “spills
over” into sovereign credit risk, a positive relationship between its level of debt and its credit
spread is created.
When the sovereign takes on credit risk there is a feedback loop from the credit risk of the
sovereign to that of the financial sector so as a consequence of the collateral damage, any sub-
sequent adverse shock that reduces the creditworthiness of the sovereign feeds back to the fi-
nancial sector’s credit risk via its sovereign exposures. Every shock that affects output growth
and thus tax revenues will lower sovereign’s own debt values and increase the financial sector’s
risk of default. This is due to the decrease in both the value of bond holdings and government
guarantees that benefit the financial sector. The direct loop occurs through the value of the
transfer pledged to the financial sector, the decrease in the value of financial sector government
bond holdings and the decrease in the value of explicit and implicit government guarantees.
These channels induce post-bailout co-movement between the financial sector’s and sovereign
credit risks in contrast with the impact of the bailout announcement because the financial credit
risk decreases and the sovereign credit risk increases.
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Analysis of the contagion
In recent times, much attention has been focused on the increase of sovereign bond yields in
the euro area especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Several gov-
ernments adopted financial sector rescue packages thus increasing the interconnection between
bank and sovereign risk. Since government rescues typically lead to an increase in public debt,
when investors perceive that a banking crisis may erupt, they increase their perception of default
risk and thus increase sovereign spreads.
In the existent literature, different model and methods have been used to make inference on the
contagion between banks and sovereign credit risk. In particular, the major evidences come
from the Eurozone especially during the financial crisis.
The effects and the dynamic of the loop can be seen from different perspectives. First of all,
the rising and development of the link between the two credit risks can be identified through
different phases. Secondly, financial institutions showed different behaviours depending on the
location of their home country.
It has been demonstrated that also some specific characteristics by inducing banks to hold more
sovereign debt securities and thus increasing the home bias in their portfolios, has contributed
to widen the connection between sovereign and banking credit risk.
Finally, monetary and fiscal policies contribute to create the basis for the development of the
loop.
2.1 The Evolution of the Loop
Before the starting of the financial crisis there was no sign of sovereign credit risk in the devel-
oped economies but from the fall of 2008 sovereign risk has become a significant problem for
many of them.
European policy makers have adopted two main approaches to deal with sovereign and banking
risk during the global financial crisis. On the one hand governments have implemented bank
rescue policies through capital injections, debt guarantees or deposit guarantees, on the other
hand, monetary policy provided liquidity to banks by intervening in sovereign debt markets
through outright purchases or by giving implicit guarantees against a speculative run.
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The rising and the evolution of the contagion between sovereign and banking credit risk in
Europe can be described by identifying three phases (Acharya et al. 2014):
• Pre-bailout phase;
• During bailout phase;
• Post bailout phase.
After the financial crisis of 2008 sovereign yields that were converging since the introduction
of the euro, sharply diverged. The increase in the dispersion was parallel to that of the CDS
premium on sovereign bonds.
FIGURE 2.1: The figure show the average EU daily mid quote CDS spreads
from the beginning of 2004 to the beginning of 2013. The average is made by
taking six of the largest European economies (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Sweden and Spain. The black line is related to the European banking sector
while the grey line is related to the sovereign CDS.
Source: Avino et al. 2014
As we can see from figure 2.1, sovereign and bank CDS spreads were converging during the
pre-crisis period. From the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 they started to diverge hav-
ing a quite unstable path and a rise in their values. This indicates the emergence of a significant
bank and sovereign credit risk in Europe. This fact can be seen by looking at the excess corre-
lation between sovereign and bank CDS. If a bank holds more sovereign debt of a country, it is
more likely to suffer losses when the default risk perception of that country increases. A bank
with a one standard deviation higher exposure to a certain country rather than another has an
excess correlation 1 with the first country 1.34% points higher (De Bruyckere et al. 2013).
The pre bailout period has been considered as starting at the beginning of 2007 and ending
at the end of 2008. Here it can be seen a large increase in bank CDS and almost no change
in the sovereign. Credit risk of the financial sector was increasing without an impact on the
1As simple correlation can be misleading during high volatile periods, the authors decided to use excess corre-
lation defined as correlation over and above what can be expected from economic fundamentals (De Bruyckere et
al. 2013)
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sovereign credit risk. European banks entered this period with substantial exposures to the so
called GIPSI countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) which soon became the
most risky ones because of the effects of the crisis. The exposures to these countries remained
pretty constant over the following two years (Acharya et al. 2013). In this pre bailout phase
there are no signs of a direct feedback loop between the two credit risks.
FIGURE 2.2: CHANGE IN SOVEREIGN AND BANK CDS BEFORE
BAILOUT
The figure shows the change in average bank and sovereign CDS for the period
that goes from 1\1\2007 to 25\09\2008. Banks CDS are the equal weighted
average of bank CDS for bank headquartered in the country.
Source: Acharya et al. 2014
After the Irish bailout on September 30, 2008, also other western European countries announced
some bailout programs consisting mainly in of debt guarantees, equity injection or asset pur-
chase programs. These bailouts programs triggered the raising of the sovereign CDS spreads
while it can be seen that banks CDS slightly decreased. Bailout programs contribute to decrease
the banking credit risk but at the expenses of a rising in the sovereign one. In particular, a 10%
rise in sovereign CDS rates led to a 5.8% decrease in banks CDS rates.
In the post bailout period both CDS increased with strong co-movements suggesting that they
may feedback on each other. A 10% increase in sovereign CDS leads to a 0.9% increase in
bank CDS. Starting from 2010 in fact banks started to managed their sovereign portfolios by
increasing their sovereign exposures to Italy, Spain and Portugal in a period in which the yield
spreads of these countries were widening (Acharya et al. 2013) thus exposing themselves to the
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FIGURE 2.3: CHANGE IN SOVEREIGN AND BANK CDS DURING
BAILOUT
The figure shows the change in average bank and sovereign CDS for the period
that goes from 26\09\2008 to 21\10\2008. Banks CDS are the equal weighted
average of bank CDS for bank headquartered in the country.
Source: Acharya et al. 2014
risk of a possible deterioration of the creditworthiness of these countries and/or an increase in
their credit risk. In particular, also the level of government debt and the level of financial sector
distress seemed to have a predictive power for the future level of sovereign CDS and the high
level of public debt is a typical characteristic of these countries. The contagion between the two
credit risks is indeed greater for countries with a high debt to GDP ratio (De Bruyckere et al.
2013). This because higher debt ratios reduce the probability of a bailout in the banking sector
and increase the credit risk level of banks through bonds in the portfolios.
However, this predictive power is not present in the pre bailout period while it becomes evident
in the other two periods. In particular, a 10% increase in pre bailout levels of the level of gov-
ernment debt and of the financial sector distress leads to a 10% and a 13% increase in sovereign
CDS respectively (Acharya et al 2014).
Post bailouts there is a situation of “private to public risk transfer” (Alter et al. 2012) in fact the
effects of a sovereign shocks have permanent effects on banks CDS spreads while the banking
sector shocks are less important. Changes in sovereign CDS spreads contribute permanently to
the financial sector CDS spreads while changes in banks risk of default affects sovereign CDS
spreads only transitorily.
Furthermore starting from 2012 the behaviour of banks reversed. While in previous years banks
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FIGURE 2.4: CHANGE IN SOVEREIGN AND BANK CDS POST BAILOUT
The figure shows the change in average bank and sovereign CDS for the period
that goes from 22\10\2008 to 30\06\2010. Banks CDS are the equal weighted
average of bank CDS for bank headquartered in the country.
Source: Acharya et al. 2014
were increasing their exposures to GIIPS countries, from 2012 they started to substantially in-
crease their exposures to their domestic sovereigns while non-domestic banks even decreased
their holdings (Acharya et al. 2013). Greater holdings of sovereign bonds increased the possi-
bility of a contagion with sovereign credit risk and the possibility of a feedback loop between
the two risks.
This shows how banks were not passively caught by the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis
but they actively increased risky sovereign debt position in their portfolios. GIIPS banks were
those that increased more their sovereign exposures. Between December 2011 and June 2012
Italian banks invested 37 billion in domestic sovereign debt, Spanish 13 billion while banks of
core countries left their exposures quite unchanged (Acharya et al. 2013).
It can be concluded that banks bailouts transferred risk from banks balance sheets to sovereigns
and this triggered the rise in sovereign credit risk.
This transfer triggered also the surge of a direct feedback loop between the two risks. Bailouts,
in fact, created a credit risk for the sovereign and this cause the price of the debt to become
sensitive to macroeconomic shocks. Furthermore, changes in the sovereign credit risk affected
the financial sector risk through: the ongoing bailout payments and subsidies, direct holdings
of government debt and explicit and implicit government guarantees. Also foreign exposures
were a crucial factor in the pricing of bank credit risk after bailouts. Effects were also greater
for countries which are within a monetary union and this explains why the effects of the loop
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had a huge importance during the European financial crisis.
When they have to decide to intervene with support to the financial sector governments clearly
face an important trade-off: on one hand bank bailouts ameliorate the underinvestment problem
of the financial sector, on the other hand they reduce the investment incentives of the nonfinan-
cial sector due to the corresponding increase in future taxation.
Usually in the short run bailouts are funded by issuing new bonds which dilutes existing bond-
holders and raises sovereign credit risk. The two-way feedback loop, as seen before, is thus
generated between sovereign and financial sector credit risk because of the exposures of finan-
cial firms on the value of government debt through direct holdings of bonds and the value of the
government guarantees.
2.2 “Core” Countries vs “Periphery” Countries
The behaviour of financial institutions has been quite different depending on the location of the
banks. In particular, the Euro zone countries can be divided in two groups: “core countries”
(Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands
and Slovakia) and “periphery” countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and
Spain).
As seen in Chapter 1 the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banks pass through
different transmission channels. In particular, the holdings of domestic sovereign debt seem to
be the most powerful one as these holdings determine the bias of banks’ portfolios.
Sovereign yields differentials particularly reflect both the differences in sovereign default risk
(country risk factor) and in country’s exposure to common or systemic risk (Altavilla et al.
2015). Systemic risk represents the danger of a Eurozone breaks up and the implied currency
redenomination.
Data show that domestic sovereign exposures are greater in the stressed (periphery) countries
than in the “core” countries (4.9% against 3.8%), hence portfolios of stressed countries are more
“home-biased” and so more exposed to the possible effects of the sovereign risk. Moreover, pe-
riphery countries accumulated sovereign debt faster thus exposing themselves to changes in
sovereign credit risk more than the core countries.
Data show also that, especially in the stressed (periphery) countries, after 2011 banks with
greater public ownership increased their domestic sovereign exposure at a faster path than the
others (Figure 2.5). This suggests that, consistently with the moral suasion hypothesis, these
banks used the liquidity provided by the ECB (two vertical lines in the figure) to fund purchases
of domestic public debt or to use it as a collateral to obtain liquidity.
In both types of countries, banks increased their domestic exposures in response to an increase
in the common risk, the so called “turn back home”. In fact, when banks fear the possibility
that some of their assets could be redenominated in a new currency at an unfavourable exchange
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FIGURE 2.5: DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES AND BANK OWNER-
SHIP
The lines show the average monthly exposure of banks. Public banks are those
with a fraction of public ownership above the relevant country average in 2008.
Private banks are those with a fraction that is below the relevant country average.
Source: Altavilla et al. 2015
rate due to the possibility of a break of the European system they tend to start to buy sovereign
bonds. This outlines that the increased risk of euro collapse and currency redenomination has
led to a greater home bias of portfolios during the financial crisis.
Following the moral suasion hypothesis, stressed-countries banks with more public ownership
and less regulatory capital increased their sovereign holdings more than other banks and re-
cently bailed out banks bought domestic debt as a consequence of the moral suasion provided
by their domestic governments. A 1% decrease in sovereign prices leads to an increase in do-
mestic sovereign holdings of publicly-owned bank 0.35% greater than that of the private ones
and in particular bailed out banks increased their holdings by 6.44% more than the other banks
(Altavilla et al. 2015)
As showed by the analysis this hypothesis predicts a greater home bias in sovereign debt portfo-
lios only for banks in stressed (periphery) countries and not in non-stressed (core) ones. Banks
of a non-distressed country seeking for high yields would have invested in foreign distressed
countries bond during the crisis rather than in domestic ones.
If we instead look at the relationship between domestic risk exposures and yield differentials
we can see that by decomposing the yield differential in a country risk and a common risk
component:
• When the country risk factor increases banks in the periphery countries respond by in-
creasing their exposures to domestic debt thus increasing the exposures to such risk of
their own country that is increasing and this is consistent with the hypothesis of the moral
suasion and the carry trade;
• When the common risk factor increases in most Eurozone countries banks react by raising
their domestic exposure, so the home bias of their portfolios and this is consistent with
the comparative advantage hypothesis.
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There are also evidences of a cross-country spillover of the feedback loop (Fratzscher et al
2015), in particular from core countries and periphery countries and vice versa. Effects are par-
ticularly stronger when the contagion goes form sovereign shocks to banking shocks. Spillovers
are larger from the periphery to the core countries. This happens because core countries’ banks
have large exposures to periphery sovereigns due to the high yields of their bonds.
A positive shock to sovereign or banks CDS in the periphery by 100 points cause an increase
in the corresponding market of the core countries by 15 and 29 basis points respectively. The
impact from the periphery to the core has been larger than that of the opposite direction and the
main important feature of this is that the core countries constitute the much larger share of the
euro area and thus of the underlying debt market.
The exposures to the possible negative effects of the feedback loop are greater in those coun-
tries that are considered as stressed. Banks therein situated are more affected by the country
risk factor because periphery countries are considered as less solid and their creditworthiness
deteriorates faster especially during financial crisis thus affecting, as we saw, the value of banks
portfolios. Core countries are less exposed to the country risk factor because of the greater
stability, but they are quite equally exposed to the systemic factor and the connected risk of
redenomination of the assets. The reactions of banks with respect to this fact are pretty much
the same across the two types of countries.
2.3 Banks characteristics that facilitate contagion
As seen before rescue schemes have caused a risk transfer from the private to the public sector
thus increasing bank and sovereign interdependence. Some specific bank characteristics have
been identified as facilitators to the creation and transmission of the contagion.
In particular, holdings of sovereign debt are affected by different banks’ characteristics such as:
the fraction of public share ownership, government bailout history and regulatory capital ratio.
Public ownership, previous occurrence of a bailout and low capitalization are associated with a
greater tendency to increase holdings of distressed government debt (Altavilla et al. 2015).
In Chapter 1 we highlighted that three main causes can trigger an increase in banks’ sovereign
debt exposures: moral suasion, carry trade and comparative advantage. Some specific bank
characteristics expose banks to one of these causes.
Moral suasion is typical of public owned banks. This because they should be more willing to
surrender to public influence than private banks and thus they should purchase more domestic
debt during distressed times. Of course local banking groups are more exposed to this type
of government pressure than foreign ones. Also recently bailout banks are more sensitive to
government pressure.
The carry trade hypothesis is instead a characteristic of poorly capitalized banks which have an
incentive to buy higher yield public debt to gamble for resurrection. During the financial crisis,
in fact, banks exploited a widening of yield spreads betting on their subsequent convergence,
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while short-term funding was still available. Incentives were much stronger for weakly capi-
talized banks that improved their regulatory capital without the costs of raising fresh equity, as
these exposures had zero capital requirements (Acharya et al. 2013).
The level of capitalization of the banks is expressed by their TIER 1 capital which serves as a
buffer for unexpected losses such as value losses on sovereign debt. In general, a one standard
deviation increase in Tier 1 capital ratio leads to a decrease in the excess correlation between
sovereign and bank CDS of about 2.06% (De Bruyckere et al. 2013). This means that better
capitalized banks expose themselves less to the sovereign credit risk and to the loop.
Also bank size is important, in general, larger banks have lower excess correlation between
their CDS and the sovereign CDS because they are perceived as “too big to fail” and so they
can count on an implicit government support. Usually for big institutions, the government is
expected to intervene when they are in trouble or prone to default. As expected, a standard de-
viation increase in the bank size leads to a reduction in correlation with foreign countries and an
increase in that with the home country, consistently with the existence of a guarantee channel.
Larger banks have lower correlation with foreign countries because being too big to fail they
can rely on implicit support from the government thereby being less sensitive to spill overs. The
link with the home country is instead opposite because the default risk of banks is more strongly
correlated to the default risk of their home country because the perceived riskiness is connected
with the probability of a government intervention.
As long as banks use sovereign bonds as collateral in short-term funding operations, their
propensity to use this type of funding has an impact on their exposures to the effects of the
loop. Data show that banks with higher propensity of short-term funding have higher excess
correlations in their CDS. A one standard deviation rise in short term funding leads to an in-
crease in sovereign exposures of 25%.
2.4 Effects to the Real Economy
As we saw in Chapter 1 one of the effects of the feedback loop is that of reducing the incentive
for the banks to lend money to the real economy. Pagano, Simonelli et al. (2015) investigated
the connection between the response of banks’ lending to sovereign stress and their holdings of
domestic public debt. An increase in sovereign risk may lead more exposed banks to cut corpo-
rate lending because of the large capital losses from debt repricing and because of the raise in
their funding costs. The results show that banks’ sovereign exposures amplified the impact of
sovereign stress on bank lending and in particular in stressed countries the more exposed banks
raised their loan rates more in response to sovereign stress.
Furthermore, sovereign exposures amplified the transmission mechanism of risk from govern-
ments to banks and the correlation between CDS premium of banks and sovereigns became
more correlated in stressed countries. Larger sovereign exposures led banks to cut more their
lending activity, in fact 1 standard deviation drop in the price of government bonds reduces
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the loan growth by 1.4 percentage points. Moreover, parent’s bank losses on sovereign debt
also influenced the lending activity of their foreign subsidiaries. This shows the effect of the
feedback loop on the real economy. In fact, by reducing their lending activities banks reduce
loans to firms thus reducing the economic growth of the country and as consequence also the tax
revenue for the government. Sovereign default risk is indeed affected by the banking sector by
at least two channels. First, the government might be compelled to act as a lender of last resort
or to recapitalize banks with public money. Secondly, financial intermediaries’ balance sheets
adjustments are important for aggregate liquidity and financial stability which affects both gov-
ernment fiscal position and credit availability for the economy as a whole which in turns affect
government spending and revenue (Gerlach et al. 2010)
2.5 Monetary and Fiscal Policies Effects
Non-standard monetary policy of the ECB and bank bailout policies by national governments
affected the relation between sovereign and banking credit risk. Bank bailouts have reduced
solvency risk of the banking sector but at the expenses of raising the credit risk of sovereigns.
Monetary policies were in most of the cases effective in lowering both credit risks.
It has been noted that monetary policies had different effects depending whether they were
announced or implemented (Fratzscher et al. 2015). The ECB monetary policies were:
• Securities Market Program;
• Longer Term Refinancing Operations;
• Outright Monetary Transactions.
The announcements of the securities market program were initially quite effective in lowering
both sovereign and banking CDS spreads however their implementation seems to have increase
banking risk and left unaffected the sovereign risk.
The other non-standard ECB policies have, on the contrary, different stories. The implemen-
tation of the LTROs initially increased both risks but then contributed to lower the banking
risk. Outright Monetary Transactions lowered the sovereign CDS spreads by 56 points. One
of the problem of the LTRO facilities was that they seemed to have provided an incentive es-
pecially to Spanish and Italians banks to significantly build up and increase their exposures to
their sovereign debt by strengthening the nexus between financial and public sector in the two
periphery countries (Acharya et al. 2013). ECB liquidity injections have also contributed to
increase the role of moral suasion and carry trade in augmenting the domestic exposures of
banks. Monetary policy seems to have facilitated sovereign debt purchases by public banks
rather than by undercapitalized ones thus amplifying more the effects of moral suasion exerted
by sovereigns rather than the carry trade channel. (Altavilla et al. 2015)
Considering the euro area as a single entity, the direct and the overall effect between sovereign
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risk and banking risk are positive, statistically and economically significant in both directions.
A one standard deviation increase in bank risk causes an increase in sovereign risk of 0.14 stan-
dard deviations. The reverse effect is stronger with a variation of 0.46. Also non-financial credit
shocks positively affect the two risks.
Banks bailout policies such as debt and deposit guarantees and capital injections into banks
were effective in reducing banking credit risk. Oppositely these policies had a much smaller
impact on sovereign risk and in some cases they induced an increase in the credit risk of na-
tional governments. To conclude all the findings, suggest that bailout policies lower default risk
of domestic banking sector but at expenses of a higher default risk of the sovereigns.
How diabolic is the loop depends also on the way fiscal policy responds (Diniz et al. 2017).
As seen before a default episode forces banks to deleverage leading to lower investments and
lower output. On the other hand government needs to require higher taxes or lower government
spending. Therefore, one of the main factors driving what happens to the economy is the fiscal
response after the default.
Debt default can lead to either change (reduce) the amount of taxes required for debt repayment
or allow for more government spending. The fiscal response following a sovereign default can
differ in two dimensions: changes in different taxes and the post default amount of debt can
evolve in different ways.
When there is a change only in lump sum taxes, say a fall, the debt fall (40%) and then recov-
ers slowly and the debt among banks’ assets drops on impact (50%). This is because banks
are forced to deleverage because of the decline of their net worth and the leverage constraints.
Capital prices decrease and private credit is reduced; this leads to a drop in investments. The
drop in asset demand because of the massive sell increase spread of capital return over the risk
free rate. The final result is a fall in the level of capital and output.
In the case of an increase in government spending, in the short run, the effect is pretty similar
to that of the lump sum. However, around ten quarters the difference become pronounced. The
increase in government spending following default reduces consumption and investments, con-
tributing to worsen the loop. Investment reaches a fall of 10% and consumption of 5%.
Changes in labor and consumption taxes: lower income taxes cause workers to supply more
labor. Pre-tax wages are lower but post-tax wages are larger and the lower labor cost is an in-
centive for firms to invest. Interest rates are larger in order to give an incentive to households
to save, so the financial disruption is quickly offset by the effect of lower labor costs. Output
goes up despite the initial drop in capital shock, household’s utility increases in the long run so
in general households are better off following the debt restructuring.
What we can say is that sovereign debt restructuring coupled with a change in labor taxes does
not generate a diabolic sovereign bank loop because the fall in value of debt does not reduce
banks’ lending capacity.
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In the case of consumption taxes the initial response of wages is pretty similar but a fall in con-
sumption taxes reduces the incentives for savings hence decreasing deposits and investments.
The combination of debt restructuring and consumption taxes leads to a fall in economic activ-
ity.
For what concerns taxes on capital income and banks, this increases capital accumulation and
output. The fall in bank taxes leads to a positive effect on bank credit and have a positive effect
on investments. Sovereign debt restructuring is better than an increase in taxes on bank’s profits.
Both in this case and in case of labor taxes, the deleterious effects of sovereign default on the
banking system are more than compensated by the relatively lower taxes. The response of the
economy is different in the short and long run. In the short run output and consumption react
more strongly in case of labor taxes while in the case of deposits and banking taxes, investment
is stimulated in the short-run but the output peaks only after 5 years. In terms of their effect on
the sovereign-bank loop taxes on banks’ profits and on deposits play very similar roles.
We can conclude that the benefits of a sovereign debt restructuring that avoids larger taxes
on banks or on capital income appear mostly in the long run while debt restructuring in place of
consumption taxes provides some short run boost to the economy but has significant negative
effects in the long run. Sovereign default forces leveraged-constrained banks to deleverage,
which has a negative impact on investment and output. As it turns out, different fiscal policy
responses interact with this deleveraging effect in different ways: increasing government con-
sumption crowds out investment, which prevents the economy from recovering in the medium
run. Lower labor taxes raise the marginal productivity of capital and the demand for invest-
ment, which more than offsets the losses from financial disruption. Lower consumption taxes
also raise the labor supply in the short run, but the stimulus for consumption crowds out invest-
ment and hence hurt the economy in the medium run. Lower taxes on banks offset the effect
of default and affect marginal lending decisions, so the effect on investment is positive. Lower
taxes on deposits affect the economy in a very similar way by reducing the costs of funds for
investment.
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Solutions to the Loop
The events of the recent financial crisis shed light on the need of an improvement of the euro
area financial architecture to make it less vulnerable to crisis. Within this need there is also the
reduction of the effects of the feedback loop seen in the previous chapters.
The crisis confirmed that it is impossible to fully insulate the banking system from a distressed
domestic sovereign. Increasing the international financial integration and thus the close links be-
tween banks and sovereigns imply that the global financial stability depends on fiscal conditions
in each individual country. Advanced country governments need to try to move to implement
credible strategies to stabilize and reduce the debt level. This will anchor the market views
about sovereign risk and avoid negative spill overs on banks (Panetta 2011).
To avoid the effects of the loop there is the need for a separation of the solvency of central
governments from that of domestic banking sectors through adequate regulation to reduce the
systemic risk both for the national economy and the international financial system (Pockrandt
et al. 2012)
The main contribution to the development of the loop and its effects came from the EU pruden-
tial regulation. In particular the decision to assign a zero risk weight to government bonds, as
seen before, played a crucial role. The choice was made under Basel I because of the crucial
role of sovereign bonds in the functioning of financial markets, with the aim to encourage the
development of local bond markets and the desire to avoid interference with fiscal and monetary
policies (Visco et al. 2016).
By giving strong preferential treatment to sovereign debt over bank loans, treating it as risk-
free asset for purposes of capital charges and imposing no concentration limit on holdings, the
regulation gave incentives to European banks to hold and accumulate more sovereign debt thus
increasing their exposures to possible negative effect deriving from the lower creditworthiness
of their domestic sovereigns. Banks were encouraged to invest in high-yield sovereign debt
rather than lending to firms and households and strengthen the impact of sovereign stress on
lending.
Possible solutions to weaken the effects of the loop could come from a better regulation of the
banking sector and the creation of safe assets that can be used as an alternative risk-free asset to
sovereign bonds.
In order to break the loop policy makers must remove one of the three ingredients saw in Chap-
ter 1. They should drastically reduce the domestic bias of banks’ sovereign exposures or find
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ways through which governments can credibly precommit to abstain from bailing out distressed
banks or finally impose controls on international capital flows to prevent the flight to quality by
domestic sovereign debt holders and bank depositors at times of sovereign stress (Brummeneier
et al. 2013). The last one of the proposed policy has been implemented mostly in Greece and
Cyprus but only as an ex-post outcome of the extreme instances of the diabolic loop and not as
an ex-ante policy to prevent the operation of the loop.
3.1 Regulation
What is important in terms of regulation is to alleviate the contagion between bank and sovereigns.
What policy makers should do is to decrease the probability of contagion and, when contagion
occurs, decrease the intensity of the risk spillovers.
Actions are thus necessary in three dimensions (De Bruyckere et al. 2013):
• Make banks more robust: for a bank is important the degree of capital adequacy and the
reliance much on the money market funding. Capital and liquidity constraints must be
more stringent and policymakers and supervisors should give incentives to bank to adjust
their business model accordingly to these restrictions. Furthermore, being the asset hold-
ing channel one of the main important for the transmission of the contagion, there might
be scope for concentration limits in sovereign bond portfolios in various dimensions.
• Make public finances more resilient and sustainable;
• Weaken the bank sovereign link.
Of much importance is also dealing with bankruptcies. Brunnemeier et al. (2011) propose two
elements:
• A credible orderly bankruptcy procedure for the sovereigns that minimizes the risk of
contagion;
• A Eurozone wide-bank resolution regime able to prevent contagion and protect European
depositors.
Resolution mechanisms should be in place to deal with distressed banks.
The creation of the banking union is crucial to address the core linkages at the root of the doom
loop because it ensures that future sovereign debt restructurings will not automatically trigger
sovereign debt distress (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018).
In the long run capital market integration will be necessary to improve financial system’s ability
to absorb asymmetrical shocks. The bank sovereign vicious circle remains deeply present even
after the encouraging early development of the SSM and SRM. Policymakers should acceler-
ate the effort to de-risk the financial sector in particular by solving the problem of NPL and
by reducing incentives for sovereign concentration risk by adopting also a European Deposit
Insurance Scheme. Risk weights on all assets, including sovereign debt, should be allowed to
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vary with realized risk (Ongena et al. 2016).
The shift from national bailout to bail-in in the handling of banking crisis, embodied in the
BRRD legislation has in some way weakened the bank-sovereign loop, but it is far from having
broken it. The main initiative should be to avoid that national governments use their domestic
banking systems for non-commercial purposes of national economic policies. First of all is im-
portant to reduce home bias in banks’ portfolios. Incentives to reduce concentrated exposures to
specific sovereigns must be given. Suggestion could be to introduce “sovereign concentration
charges” for those banks that hold sovereign exposures to any euro area country in excess of a
threshold.
Useful could be also the creation of a European deposit insurance system that creates equal pro-
tection for all insured euro area depositors and precludes geographical ring fencing. It should
be managed by a single authority at the European level and it must differentiate some elements
across countries:
• Maintain incentives for governments by pricing country-specific risk in the calculation of
insurance premiums;
• Losses should first be borne by the relevant national compartment of EDIS1 while com-
mon funds can be tapped only in large systemic crisis which overburden one or more
national compartments.
The banking union requires geographically diversified banking groups within the euro area.
This cross border integration should not lead to an excessive size of the largest banking groups
that would then benefit from a perceived “too big to fail status” (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018).
Attention must also be put on the interaction between the banking sector and government fiscal
conditions (Panetta 2011):
• If the risk on sovereign debt remains high, authorities should closely monitor the inter-
action between sovereign risk and regulatory policies which provide banks with strong
incentives to hold large amounts of government debt;
• Banks need to have strong capital bases;
• During a sovereign crisis authorities should ensure that there is sufficient transparency on
bank’s sovereign exposures.
Finally, authorities should monitor by mitigating the negative impact on bank funding:
• Bank supervisors and central banks with liquidity surveillance mandates could invest ad-
ditional resources to improve their capacity to conduct stress tests that focus on the impact
of a sovereign shock on the liquidity position of banks;
1European Deposits Insurance Scheme
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• Central banks might consider having flexible operational frameworks that allow them to
supply funding to a diverse set of counterparties and accept a broad range of collateral
during a crisis, to ease banks’ immediate liquidity pressures;
• Sovereign debt management offices might consider changing operational aspects of their
OTC derivatives transactions to mitigate the propagation of sovereign risk.
3.2 Lack of a Safe Asset
One of the main problems of European financial markets seems to derive from the lack of safe
assets. Safe assets importance is related to the fact that the actual financial system relies heavily
on them and they are also crucial both for private and public investors and for the ECB itself.
Safe assets allow market participants to transfer risks, like liquidity or market risk, without cre-
ating new risks like counterparty credit risk (Brunnemeier et al. 2016).
A substantial part of the banks’ balance sheet must be in safe assets, as defined by the financial
regulators and many large classes of investors such as pension funds must hold a significant
amount of safe assets in their portfolios. Also risky private investors need to park investments
in safe vehicles. Finally, during the implementation of its conventional monetary policies the
ECB should exchange money for safe bonds.
The most used safe assets are, by now, U.S. Treasury bills and bonds but Europe, despite having
a large economy, developed financial markets and one of the world’s reserve currency, does not
supply a safe asset as the U.S. one. In the Eurozone, in fact, there is no safe asset that guarantees
a pay-off at virtually any point in time and state of the world, including crisis (Brunnemeier et
al. 2016).
In the absence of such a safe asset regulators and policy makers have treated euro area sovereign
bonds as safe. Bonds such as those of Germany and Greece have been treated in the same way
even though they were traded at widely different prices in the market. ECB have accepted all
sovereign bonds of the member states in its discounting operations. The situation boosted the
rise of the diabolic loop leading to the need for the creation of a safe asset that banks can hold
without being exposed to sovereign risk.
By storing value in safe assets, rather than the risky sovereign bonds of the nation-state in which
they reside, banks can avoid the effects of the diabolic loop between their solvency and that of
their sovereign.
A union wide safe asset ensures that the flight to safety capital flows occur across assets rather
than countries. In fact, another consequence of the lack of a European safe bond was that bonds
of some European countries (centre) have satisfied the demand for safe assets causing, in crisis
times, flows of capital from the periphery to the centre and, in boom phases, from the centre to
the periphery. These two ways of searching for yield and searching for “safe” heaven caused
large capital account imbalances in the euro area (Brunnemeier et al. 2011).
In 2016 European banks hold 1.9tn of euro sovereign bonds, many of which were risky. The
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asymmetric provision of safe assets caused by the “flight to safety” created distortion and this
was particularly pronounced in Europe because Germany supplies 83% of triple-A rated euro
denominated sovereign debt (Brunnemeier et al. 2016). During the pre-crisis capital flowed
from non-vulnerable countries to vulnerable countries as a consequence of the perceived rel-
ative abundance of investment opportunities and the absence of foreign exchange risk. As a
result bond, spreads were compressed and investors treated all euro area nation-states’ bonds as
safe. In 2009 the short term capital flows started to reverse as the perceived risk that some euro
securities might be redenominated in a different currency at a devaluated exchange rate rose.
As a consequence borrowing costs for vulnerable countries increased. Flight to safety capital
flowed from high-risk to low risk countries.
In order to solve this problem the main important solution proposed is that of the so called Eu-
ropean Safe Bonds. These bonds will have all the characteristics of safety in order to let banks
diversify their portfolios without relying too much on government bonds and will be able to
prevent the flow of capital caused by the “flight to safety”.
3.2.1 European Safe Bonds (ESBies)
The main proposal for trying to solve the problems related to the lack of a safe asset is the
creation of a European Safe Bond (ESBies) (Brunnemeier et al. 2011). This bond will be
issued by a European debt agency in accordance with European treaties and it will have all
three main characteristics:
• Liquidity;
• Minimal risk of default;
• Denomination in a currency with a stable purchasing power.
It will be liquid because these bonds will be traded in large volumes as they serve as safe haven
for investors looking for a negative correlation with other yields.
It will be safe because it is designed to minimize risk of default and it will be issued in euros
thus having the benefits of the ECB’s anti-inflation commitment.
ESBies will be freely traded on the market and will be held by banks, investors and central
banks. By being combined with an appropriate regulation they will be able to solve the problem
of the feedback loop and of the flight to safety.
Banks will be able to better diversify their portfolios by having an alternative to sovereign bonds
which break the dependence from public finances.
Functioning
“ESBies are securities issued by a European Debt Agency (EDA) composed of the senior
tranche on a portfolio of sovereign bonds issued by European states, held by that agency and
potentially further guaranteed through a credit enhancement.” (Brunnemeier et al. 2011) More
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specifically the EDA should buy the sovereign bonds of member nations according to some
fixed weights with no possibilities of changing them as a response to any crisis, perceived or
real. There is no room for the EDA to bailout a nation that have difficulties in placing its
sovereign debt. The sovereign bonds bought will be taken passively as assets in the balance
sheet and used as collateral to issue two types of securities (Figure 3.1):
• The first one would grant the right to a senior claim to the payments from the bonds held
in the portfolio. A relatively large cut off threshold will be settled and losses under that
threshold will not affect the bonds repayments. Furthermore the EDA by using some
initial capital paid in by the member states will offer a further guarantee on the payment;
• The second security is composed of the junior tranche on the portfolio bonds. It will be
sold to willing investors on the market. In contrast with the first security this will be risky
because its expected return will reflect any risk that a state may fail to honour in full its
debts. Any loss will be absorbed by the owners of the security and not by the EDA.
The trenching point into which the junior is subordinated to the senior is set accordingly to a
pre specified standard. The suggestion is to set 70% represent by ESBies and 30% by EJBies
(Brunnermeier et al. 2016)
FIGURE 3.1: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF TRENCHING WITH
POSSIBLE CREDIT ENHANCEMENT
Source: Brunnemeier et al. 2011
European banks, pension funds and the ECB would be a natural starting clientele for the ESBIes
and, as their reputation will grow; they could be used as Treasury Bills are used today and also
as a reserve currency asset by non-member countries.
In order to be effective the ESBies depends on two regulatory changes:
• The ECB would grant direct preferential treatment to ESBies by accepting them as its
main from of collateral in repo and discounting operations. The holdings of bonds will
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thus be indirect through the ESBies. Of course it will only hold the safe tranche of the
bond. In this way conventional monetary policies won’t create credit risk and the ECB
will have a safe balance sheet;
• Banking regulators would give a zero risk weight to ESBies but not automatically to the
other sovereign bonds.
Benefits
The introduction of the safe bonds will have several benefits for the financial stability of the
euro area.
• First of all the change in bank regulation, the appropriate risk weights and the ECB hair-
cuts to sovereign bonds will eliminate the mispricing affecting the European sovereign
bonds.
• Secondly the shift of bank portfolios from risk sovereign debt to safe ESBies will lead
banks to still hold national bonds but only against the appropriate regulatory capital that
their risk reflects. As ESBies give claim on the safest portion of the cash flow that is
generated from a well-diversified portfolio of bonds, banks could avoid having huge ex-
posures to national bonds which are at the basis of the diabolic loop between sovereign
and banking crisis.
• The EDA will capture some of the “safe haven” premium that investors are willing to
pay in exchange for the safety and liquidity of the asset, now taken by Germany on its
sovereign bonds.
• The “flight to quality” will be shifted out of the junior tranche and into the ESBies rather
than out of one European region and into another thus stabilizing portfolio of sovereign
debt.
• ECB will benefit by conducting open market operation using ESBies that can be used
as safe assets in exchange of money. The ESBies could also be used for unconventional
monetary policies if they are exchanged for riskier securities.
• The safety of the ESBies does not rely on any particular government to extract resources
by taxation;
• They require no change in European treaties.
Weights of the Portfolio
The objective is to assign a weight equal to the average weight of the country’s GDP in overall
Eurozone GDP making an average on the previous 5 years. The past average allow to avoid
that a country suffers a terrible shock in a year falling into a recession with the need to borrow
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abroad and causing the EDA having to reduce its holdings of that country’s bonds potentially
deepening the crisis. Finally it does not gave an incentive to the sovereigns to trick the ESDA
by inflating the provisional estimates of GDP as the final GDP numbers are usually only known
with some delay. The detailed weights for country are depicted in figure 3.2.
FIGURE 3.2: COUNTRY WEIGHTS IN THE ESBies
Source: Brunnemeier et al. 2011
Safety
The features ensuring the safety of the ESBies are three:
• Diversification or pooling: by pooling together different bonds it will be less likely that
they will default all together at the same time. The expected losses in the overall poll are
thus lower.
• Trencing: being the senior tranche of the bond portfolios ESBies are the first to get payed
from the revenue of the bonds;
• Credit enhancement: it is provided by a public entity in order to avoid that private market
parties by providing guarantees become too big to fail.
The creation of the Esbies will lead European countries to enter the more easily capital markets
thus reducing the panic that is currently running the market. They will reduce the contagion
between banks and sovereign risk and in the event of a collapse of the EMU project they will
stabilize markets.
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Empirical Analysis
In this chapter, we present an empirical analysis of the link between sovereign and banking
credit risk by using sovereign and banking CDS.
As we saw in the previous chapters the link between the credit risk of the sovereign and the
banking credit risk can be a crucial element for the creation and development of the negative
feedback loop with its negative effects on the economy. What we will do in this chapter is to
find if there are evidences of this link in Italy and Germany and we will try to make a compari-
son between the two countries.
Our work is divided in two sections. The first one deals with the Italian case. We analyze the
credit risk contagion in the country by dividing the data window in five sub-periods referring to
some economic facts happened at the country level.
In the second part, instead, we make a comparison between Italy and Germany. Here we divide
the data window in three sub-periods referring to some economic policy decisione taken by the
ECB.
To conduct the analysis, we use CDS spreads as measures of credit risk.
The chapter is structured as follows: the first paragraph gives a general overview of the eco-
nomic situation of the two countries in the data window, the second paragraph presents the data
for both countries and the third gives a general graphical analysis for the two countries. The
following paragraphs present the Italian case analysis and the comparison analysis. For both
analyses we first made a preliminary graphical analysis and a summary statistics and finally an
empirical analysis. The last paragraph concludes.
4.1 The Economic Situation: brief overview
Here we provide an overview of the economic situation of the two countries in the data window
considered in our analysis. First, we decided to choose these two countries because of the big
differences in their creditworthiness. Germany is the more stable country in the Eurozone while
Italy because of the high debt and the political instability is perceived as a quite risky country.
Because of this different economic situations the two countries were hit by the financial crisis
and react to it in different ways. Furthermore as we saw in Chapter 2 in terms of sovereign
credit risk Germany is defined as a “core” country, while Italy is a “periphery” country and this
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leads to different behaviour of their financial sectors and to different levels of contagion and
effects of the loop (Altavilla et al. (2015)).
4.1.1 Italy
Like in the majority of the European countries, the financial crisis of 2008 severely hit Italy.
The main features of the Italian crisis were the already high level of public debt before the
starting of the crisis, the limited GDP growth before the crisis and the poor credibility of the
political class.
Starting from 2008, Italy experienced periods of stagnation and recession with losses on GDP
and increasing public debt. In 2009 the global GDP decreased by 1.2% and Italy experienced a
contraction of 5%1 . There was a slight recovery in 2010 with the GDP that increased by 1.7%
but this did not coincide with an inversion in tendency.
From 2011 on, the GDP continued to decrease because of the recession that was hitting the
country. In 2017, the Italian GDP was still 62 percentage points below its pre-crisis level.
The economic situation was reflected also in public finances causing a sovereign debt crisis. In
2011, the “spread” reached 500 points and the rating agency Standard Poors’ downgraded the
country.
The Italian financial system was not affected too much because of the low international dimen-
sion of Italian banks. After the Lehman default and the contagion to the real economy of all the
European countries, Italy saw a decrease in investments, income and consumption. This was
particularly because most of the economies hit by the crisis were commercial partners of Italy.
The increasing spread became a problem for the activity of the financial sector because Italian
banks had a huge quantity of domestic bonds in their portfolios (60% of bond portfolios of the
five major Italian banks were made of Italian sovereign bonds3). This caused a lack of credibil-
ity of the financial system causing banks to be undercapitalized and facing a huge liquidity risk.
Meanwhile the public debt started to increase since 2008.
The main problems of the banking sector were not toxic products but their holdings of domestic
debt. As we saw, the five major banks had 60% of their portfolios made of sovereign bonds.
These exposures left the banking sector highly exposed to the credit risk of the sovereign. The
share of banks’ assets consisting in Italian sovereign debt securities tripled from 3.5% in 2007
to 10.1% in 2013 and went up to 10.5% in June 20154 . The share in total securities went from
18.7% to 39.8%5. The government had to intervene in order to rescue some financial institu-
tions. At the end of 2015 there was the resolution of 4 small banks (Banca Marche, Banca
Etruria, CariFerrara and CariChieti) which costed 5.3 billion. In the middle of 2017, the rescue
of Banca Monte Paschi with a public intervention of 5.4 billion and a private support of 4.3
1Data taken from: “Relazione sull’economia e la finanza pubblica per il 2010”
2Data taken from: Panetta (2018)
3Data taken from: Il sole 24 ore (Pavesi)
4Data taken from: Affinito et al. (2016)
5Data taken from: Affinito et al. (2016)
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billion6 and that of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza with the help of Banca Intesa
San Paolo and a cost of 11.2 billion7 .
Today the banking sector is emerging from a prolonged period of distress. The lending to the
private sector is growing since 2016 and the flow of NPL has been decreasing since 2014 (2%
of total loans8). The holdings of domestic debt are decreasing since the pick of 2015 (120 bil-
lion9).
In 2017, the Italian economic growth strengthened considerably. GDP has been supported by
domestic demand. The projections tell that the net international investment position will turn
positive in three years from now.
After having increased by 30 percentage points since the start of the crisis, the debt to GDP ra-
tio has remained broadly stable thanks to the increase in GDP growth and to persistent primary
surpluses. Public debt remains high.
The banking sector is in a recovery phase with growing lending activity to the private sector
since 2016 and the flow of NPL decreasing since 2014. Banks are selling large amounts of
non-performing loans in the market: 30 billion in 2017 and other 25 billion expected for 2018.
Improvement can be seen also on the liabilities side with declining funding costs and declining
credit spreads over the others leading banks.
Important changes have been made also to the industrial organization of the banking sector. The
reform of the mutual banking sector led more than 300m small cooperative banks to become
part of the three largest banking groups.
4.1.2 Germany
As for all the other European economies, also Germany was hit by the recent financial crisis.
In 2009 the German economy contracted by a 5%10 while there was a drop of 3.7% in the euro
zone overall.
In 2008 the annual economic growth rate fell to 1% and in 2009 it became negative (-4.7%).
Germany was an export dependent country and its GDP fell by a cumulative 6.6 percentage
points over five successive quarters from the beginning of 2008 but then it bounced back to its
pre-crisis level in the first quarter of 201111 .
Although real GDP growth in Germany remained stable until 2008, German banks were among
the first to suffer from the financial crisis mainly because of the substantial exposures to struc-
tured credit products originated in the US.
The main causes of the banking sector problems were (Hufner (2010)):
• The activities of the Landesbanken which benefitted from government guarantees without
a proper business model;
6Data taken from: Il sole 24 ore (Carli)
7Data taken from: Panorama (Telara)
8Data taken from: Panetta (2018)
9Data taken from: Panetta (2018)
10Data taken from Ahearn et al. (2009)
11Data taken from: Storm et al. (2014)
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• Weak capitalization and high fragmentation of the whole banking system;
• Deficiencies in banking regulation and supervison.
In the short run substantial government intervention were fundamental for the stability of the
system; as of August 2009, the volume amounted to 24% of GDP.
Two of the specialized private banks, Hypo Real Estate and Industrie-Kreditbank and the two
big banks Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank experienced large losses. HRE, IKB and Com-
merzbank had to be rescued with government interventions. The recapitalization of Com-
merzbank was made in the middle of 2009 with an amount of 18 billion12 while Hypo Real
Estate was rescued and nationalized with an injection of 35 billion of liquidity13 .
Only Deutsche Bank saved herself without government intervention (Behr et al. 2015).
The success and the recovery of the country was due to stimulus and bailout programs which
include 480 billion to sustain banks and had an overall cost amount to 4% of GDP. From 2011
the GDP has started growing again, 2.2% in 201714.
Today Germany has the strongest economy in the Euro area but despite this its banking sector
is quite weak and this, as we saw has forced the government to intervene often to give support
to its domestic banks. The total amount of help given to the financial sector amounts to more
than 7% of the GDP from the beginning of the crisis in 2008 (Pavesi sole24ore 5 gen 2016). In
general the banking sector has a problem of weak capitalization.
FIGURE 4.1: The figure shows the percentage GDP change for the two countries
from 2008 to 2016. We can clearly see different trends between the two countries.
Germany had a positive % change starting from 2009 while Italy experienced
positive changes only in the last four years starting from 2013.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
12Data taken from: Genner et al. (2009)
13Data taken from: Buder et al. (2011)
14Data taken from: statistisches bundesamt
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4.2 Data
In order to develop the empirical analysis, the work focuses on a 10-year window of data which
cover the financial crisis and the post-crisis period. Data go from 22 October 2008 to 22 Octo-
ber 2018.
To deal with the loop, we decided to use Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads.
CDS contracts are useful because they are bilateral agreements that represent a protection pro-
vided by the CDS seller to the buyer. The seller is committed to compensate the buyer in case
of the occurrence of a pre-defined credit event. The buyer makes regular payments to the seller
(CDS spread) and in return receives a compensation for his loss in case of a credit event. When a
credit event occurs, the seller compensates the buyer for the loss by either paying the face value
of the bond in exchange for the defaulted one (physical settlement) or by paying the difference
between the post-default market value (determined by an auction procedure) of the bond and
the par value (cash settlement). CDS differ from a typical insurance contract because: the party
who buys the CDS do not necessarily have to hold the assets that create the risk exposure and
because they are traded over the counter while insurance contracts are generally not traded. For
the reason aforementioned CDS contracts are usually used as trading instruments rather than
insurance instruments.
Given their structure, the CDS spread capture the credit risk of the underlying asset and CDS
markets react quite instantly to changes in credit risk so the premium reflects market percep-
tions in real time. They are more effective than bonds in pricing default risk because; the latter
represent also other forms of risk. Furthermore, the price of a CDS reflects the expected loss in
case of default and so it is less influenced by other factors such as liquidity.
For these reasons CDS can easily been used to measure the mutual contagion in the credit risk
of banks and sovereign.
We collected all CDS quotes from Datastream. As a measure of the risk, we will use the 5Y
senior debt CDS contracts of the governments and the banking sector of the two countries. The
choice of the 5Y CDS was made because they are known to be the most actively traded and
therefore the most liquid ones.
For what concerns the bank CDS we constructed a pool of six of the major banks of the two
countries whose data were available. We used an asset-weighted average of the banks by taking
the data from the 2016 financial statements. The two pools are presented in the table.
According to the assets of each group we assigned a weight of 43% to Intesa, 36% to Uni-
credit, 3.5% to Mediobanca, 8% to MPS, 4% to BNL and 5.5% to UBI for the Italian pool. For
the German one a 54% as been assigned to Deutsche Bank, 7% to Bayerische, 17% to Com-
merzbank, 9% to Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg, 7% to Norddeutsche Landesbank and 6%
to Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen.
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POOL OF BANKS
ITALY GERMANY
Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Bayerische Landesbank
Intesa San Paolo Commerzbank
Medio Banca Deutsche Bank
Monte dei Paschi Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg
UBI Banca Landesbank Hesse-Thuringen
Unicredit Norddeutsche Landesban k
TABLE 4.1: The table shows the two pools of banks taken as a representation of
the banking sector of the two countries
Source: author’s own evaluation
4.3 Preliminary Analysis
First we give a graphical representation of the CDS spreads considered in our analysis and we
try to study the evolution of the banking and sovereign CDS of both countries. We start from
the study of the whole period for both countries in order to have a general graphical overview
of the data window considered.
Figure 4.2 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5Y maturity during the selected
period from 22 October 2008 to 22 October 2018. The blue line represents sovereign CDS
while the red one represents the asset-weighted average of banks CDS.
FIGURE 4.2: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for the period 22/10/2008 to 22/06/2018. The blue line represents
the sovereign CDS spreads. The red line represents the banks CDS which are
computed as the asset weighted average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian
banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
From the figure, we can easily identify a co-movement of the two CDS series. The two lines
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show a similar path suggesting that there could be a link between the two risk represented by
CDS.
There is quite stable trend at the beginning of the sample with a slight increase during 2008
because of the start of the financial crisis and the Lehman Brothers default. A slight recovery
can be seen in the following two years. The situation worsened on 2011 whit the intensification
of the crisis and the start of the sovereign debt crisis. Both sovereign and banks CDS increased
sharply, this coincides with the worst period for the country with the spread reaching its max-
imum value (500 points) and a political instability due to the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi
and the following Monti’s government.
The high level of the CDS reflected the high level of sovereign credit risk of that moment which
coincided with a downgrade of the country from the rating agencies. A slight recovery can be
seen from 2013 with both CDS returning gradually to their pre-crisis levels.
From 2015 we can see a divergence of the two series as a sign that something could have re-
duced the link between the two CDS series. We can see a kind of turmoil in the banks CDS
series around 2016 probably due to the bailout of Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, CariFerrara and
CariChieti (5.3 billion) and around 2017 with the bailout of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare
di Vicenza and the recapitalization of Banca Monte dei Paschi.
If we look more deeply at the figure, we can see that the two lines overlap and cross each
other. At the beginning of the sample the two CDS spreads are quite at the same level with the
sovereign ones that are quite higher. This can be a clue of the link between the two credit risk.
At the beginning the major risk was that of the sovereign with the value of the bond decreas-
ing because of the higher spread and the high level of public debt of the country. When the
sovereign debt crisis erupted, we can see a cross between the two lines with the banks CDS that
became higher. This was probably due to the transfer of the risk from the sovereign to the banks
due to the home bias of banks portfolios which decreased their value as a consequence of the
deterioration of the creditworthiness of the country and the subsequent decrease of the value of
the government bonds.
Figure 4.3 presents the same data for Germany. The blue line represents sovereign 5Y CDS
spreads while the red one represents the asset-weighted average of banks 5Y CDS spreads.
First, we can see that both values of sovereign and bank CDS spreads are much lower than the
Italian ones. This reflects the different perception of the riskiness of the two countries. What
can be easily seen from the figure is that the Banks CDS are above the sovereign CDS spreads
during the whole period. This gives evidence to the the fact that, as we saw before, the German
banking sector, despite the strong economy of the country, presents many weaknesses and this
is reflected in the high credit risk perception of the investors.
The two series follow quite a different path.
Sovereign CDS have a more regular trend without great shocks. There is an increase in the
values at the beginning of the sample due to the rescue of the Hypo Real Estate bank at the end
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FIGURE 4.3: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for the period 22/10/2008 to 22/06/2018. The blue line represents
the sovereign CDS spreads. The red line represents the banks CDS which are
computed as the asset weighted average of the CDS spreads of the six German
banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
of 2008 and the stimulus package for the economy and the recapitalization of Commerzbank at
the beginning of 2009. The path then is almost constant in the following years with an increase
in 2011 due to the sovereign debt crisis. From 2012 starts a recovery phase with a declining
trend as a consequence of the solidity of the creditworthiness of the country.
For what concerns the banks CDS, we can see an unstable general path. The initial trend as we
saw was due to the rescue of Commerzbank and Hypo Real Estate.
From 2010 we can see an increasing trend with a sharp rise in the value following the sovereign
debt crisis.
A recovery phase started in 2012 with a stable path until the beginning of 2016. Here he turmoil
is probably due to the crisis of Deutsche Bank which lost value on its shares since 2015 and
received a downgrade from Standard Poor’s Global Ratings in the middle of 2016. Deutsche
bank as we saw represents a big percentage weight in our pool of banks because of its dimen-
sions so a shock in its CDS levels causes an increase also in the pool level.
The preliminary analysis just presented gives a primary picture of the differences between the
two countries. On one hand, Italy presents greater values of both bank and sovereign CDS be-
cause of the greater riskiness of the country. The difference as we could expect is more evident
for the sovereign bonds and it is clearly the situation described by the "spread" with Germany
perceived as a low risk country.
For the banking sector, the difference is not so marked and this suggests that despite the
sovereign stability of the country, the German banking sector is not stable as well and this
could be a starting point for the contagion of the two credit risks.
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In general we saw that the comovement of the two lines is more evident in Italy and this could
suggest that we can expect the link between sovereign and banking credit risk to be greater in
Italy than in Germany where the sovereign has a low risk level.
4.4 Contagion in Italy
In this section we provide an analysis of the contagion between sovereign and banking risk in
Italy. Within the 10-years time horizon we identify 5 economic events that could have influenced
credit risk in the country:
• PERIOD 1: from 22/10/2008 to 15/11/2011. This period goes from the post Lehman
Brothers default to the nomination of the Monti’s government;
• PERIOD 2: from 16/11/2011 to 26/04/2013. The period covers the duration of the
Monti’s government;
• PERIOD 3: from 29/04/2013 to 23/06/2016. This is the period of bailouts, it includes
the resolution of Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, CariFerrara and CariChieti, the rescue of
Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza and the recapitalization of Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena;
• PERIOD 4: from 24/06/2016 to 01/06/2018. The period goes from the rescue of the
banks to the election of the Conte’s government;
• PERIOD 5: from 04/06/2018 to 22/10/2018. The period relates to the first 5 months of
the Conte’s government.
First of all, we provide a graphical analysis of each of the 6 periods.
Figure 4.4 shows sovereign and banks CDS in the first period. The period goes from the post
default of Lehman brothers to the begin of Monti’s government. As we can see, at the begin-
ning of the period both CDS levels were pretty low and show a common path. There is an
initial increasing trend as a consequence of the Lehman Brothers default but then the two CDS
levels seemed to have recovered until the beginning of 2010. This suggests that a real credit risk
problem was not in place.
When in 2010 the effects of the financial crisis started to become greater and in 2011 the
sovereign debt crisis erupted both banks and sovereign CDS began to increase. A credit risk
problem for the country arose from both the government perspective and the banking one.
This change of trend may have facilitated the surge of a contagion bewteen the two risk in fact
we can see that the two levels of CDS comoves before and after the start of the crisis.
Period 2 (Figure 4.5) covers the duration of Monti’s government. The nomination of the new
government took place during the most severe period for the country with the spread reaching
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FIGURE 4.4: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for Period 1. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
is highest value at 500 points. Therefore from figure 4.5 we can see that at the beginning both
CDS level has high values which remains high during the whole period. Despite that, a general
declining trend can be seen for both sovereign and banking credit risk as a consequence of the
austerity measures ("decreto salva Italia") taken by the government in order to reduce public
expenditure and gain the trust of international investors. At the end of the period even if the
values remain still high we can see a kind of stabilization of the two risks.
FIGURE 4.5: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for Period 2. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
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In period 3 (figure 4.6) we can see that after an initial upsurge there is an overall declining trend
for both CDS. This suggests that the austerity measures of the government were effective in re-
ducing the risk of both sovereign and the banking sector. The two lines follow a quite common
path suggesting that a link between the two risks is still in place.
The two lines also overlap in some moments suggesting that a transfer of risk could have hap-
pened between the two entities. At the end of the period we can see a slight increase in banks
CDS.
In the last part of the period in fact Italy experienced tha bailout and the recapitalization of some
financial institutions. In 2016 the initial increase in the banking sector CDS spreads is due to
the resolution of 4 banks (Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, CariFerrara e CariChieti). The CDS
level of the banking sector remains high also in 2017 as a consequence of the rescue of Veneto
Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza and the recapitalization of Banca Monte dei Paschi di
Siena. The trend is quite increasing especially for banks CDS as a reflection of the turmoil of
the financial sector which has culminated with the rescue operations of the banks. Here we
expect the contagion between the two risks to have become stronger as we can see that the two
CDS series comove especially in the initial and in the last part of the period.
FIGURE 4.6: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for Period 3. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
Period 4 goes from the recapitalization of Monte dei Paschi to the beginning of Conte’s gov-
ernment. In figure 4.7 we can see that after the bailout operations in the banking sector both
sovereign and bank CDS have a stable quite declining trend until the middle of the period. The
declining trend is much more visible for the banking sector in fact the two lines overlap each
other at the beginning of 2018. This suggests that the rescue operations helped reducing the risk
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FIGURE 4.7: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for Period 4. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
on the banking sector but as the level of sovereign CDS does not decline in the same way maybe
some of the risk has been transferred from the banking to the sovereign as a consequence of the
rescue operations aforementioned. Especially in the case of Banca Monte dei Paschi govern-
ment guarantees played a crucial role and this could have caused a tranfer of the risk.
At the beginning of 2018 we can see that both level of CDS started to increase probably as a
consequence of the political instability due to the end of Gentiloni’s government and the follow-
ing elections that took place in March 2018. Becaues of the elections and the reinforcement of
a anti-Europe current of tought in the country the stability of the country was compromised also
because of the negotiations of the "contratto di governo". This political uncertainty is reflected
in the rise of both CDS as long as we approach the nomination of the Conte’s government.
Finally, the last period covers the first 5 months of the Conte’s government. We can see from
Figure 4.8 a slight increasing trend in both the curves probably due to the speculation to the
possibility of an exit of the country from the European Union.
The path is more increasing in the final part of the period as a consequence of the discussion
upon the "Documento di Economia e Finanza" which gave a rise in the spread level with Ger-
man 10Y Bunds and increased the riskiness of the country. During the overall period we can
see that the two lines comove so we can expect that the contagion between the two credit risk is
still in place and may have increased with respect to the previous periods.
The graphical analysis just made shows that in quite all the periods considered the two CDS
series present a comovement suggesting that a link between the two risks is in place. In particu-
lar from the empirical analysis we expect lower connection in the first period and an increase in
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FIGURE 4.8: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-
year maturity for Period 5. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
the other periods starting from the sovereign debt crisis. Especially in the last period in which
the political instability has increased the level of the spread we should find an increase in the
strength of the link.
In the following sections we will present the empirical analysis in order to find if there are
evidences of what we have said in the graphical analysis.
4.4.1 Empyrical Analysis
We now present the regression analysis in order to find evidences of what we said in the prelim-
inary graphical analysis.
Based on the model used by Caporin et al. (2017) we estimate all the regression in the data
sample on a daily basis in order to have a large and significant dataset. We tested the presence
of a contagion between sovereign and banking credit risk.
To do so we verify whether changes in banking credit risk affects significantly sovereign credit
risk. More specifically we test if a variation on the daily change in the logarithm of banks CDS
spreads has a significant effect on the daily change in the logarithm of sovereign CDS.
Moreover, following Caporin et al. (2017) we add in the model a set of controlling variables of
some international risks.
First, we include Euro Stoxx 50 Index and the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX), then
we controlled also for Oil price (OIL) and the liquidity risk in the money market (LIQ). The
liquidity risk is computed as the difference between the 1-month Euribor and the Repo spread.
Finally, as European banking systems are quite connected we control also for European banking
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sector daily CDS spreads.
All Data are taken from DATASTREAM.
Our work is divided in two sections. First we run a linear OLS regression analysis on the
data and then, to provide more evidences of what we found with the linear approach, we use
also the non linear approach of the quantile regression.
Before presenting the results of the two regression analysis we provide a summary statistics.
Summary Statistics
Here we provide a summary statistics for the data of each period selected for the analysis.
Results are presented in table 4.2.
We have 2609 observations for each variable. More specifically we have 800 observations for
the first period, 378 for the second, 1092 for the third, 238 for period 4 and 101 for the fifth and
last period.
If we look at the numbers we can see that sovereign CDS are high in the first two periods as
a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand domestic banks CDS are higher
in the second and third period. European banks CDS instead show high levels in the first two
periods.
From a general point of view we can see that the levels of the three variables of interest are
quite high in the first three periods as a consequence of the financial crisis while they generally
decrease in the following two periods.
Linear Regression Results
Now we present the first part of the analysis, which consists of a multiple linear regression of
the model presented before by using the OLS estimator with robust standard errors.
The regression function is the following:
∆ log(ITAit) = αi + βij,1∆ log(ITABankst)+ β
i
j,2∆ log(EUBankst)+ β
i
j,3∆ log(STOXXt)+
βij,4∆ log(VSTOXXt) + β
i
j,5∆ log(LIQt) + β
i
j,6∆ log(OILt) + ut
Where the dependent variable ITA is the change in the natural logarithm of Italian govern-
ment CDS from day t to t+1 while the explanatory variable of interest ITABanks is the change
in natural logarithm of CDS in the pool of banks built by the author from day t to t+1.
The parameter of interest is thus β1 and it shows the relationship between the daily change in
sovereign CDS and domestic banking sector CDS spreads. The other controlling variables ex-
press the daily change in the logarithm of each of the index described above and they are useful
to control for other type of international risks that could have affected the sovereign credit risk.
Of a kind of interest is also the coefficient β2 since it gives the relationship between daily change
4.4. Contagion in Italy 51
Period 1 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ITA 800 146.584 84.938 48 498.659
ITABanks 800 156.245 91.096 60.048 517.071
EUBanks 800 242.383 82.124 123.136 489.483
STOXX 800 2641.467 279.701 1809.98 3068.002
VSTOXX 800 31.465 10.776 18.36 76.54
LIQ 800 -0.263 0.275 -0.675 0.863
OIL 800 80.837 23.342 33.73 126.64
Period 2
ITA 378 308.842 90.928 182.919 491.409
ITABanks 378 406.181 93.111 259.445 642.191
EUBanks 378 382.089 83.411 254.106 552.179
STOXX 378 2455.253 175.707 2068.664 2749.273
VSTOXX 378 24.231 5.737 14.86 41.21
LIQ 378 -0.523 0.207 -0.777 0.14
OIL 378 110.990 7.304 88.69 128.14
Period 3
ITA 1092 115.861 38.291 69.25 244.6
ITABanks 1092 168.143 65.105 85.485 399.987
EUBanks 1092 154.144 45.664 85.246 291.177
STOXX 1092 3172.909 262.788 2511.828 3828.784
VSTOXX 1092 20.633 4.949 11.16 40.8
LIQ 1092 -0.2175 0.153 -0.638 0.29
OIL 1092 70.304 28.264 26.01 117.15
Period 4
ITA 238 61.694 1.123 42.039 107.93
ITABanks 238 83.977 20.438 51.308 169.232
EUBanks 238 78.002 12.871 41.121 103.491
STOXX 238 3512.016 88.924 3278.715 3697.4
VSTOXX 238 14.749 3.3936 10.68 34.74
LIQ 238 -0.370 0.001 -0.374 -0.366
OIL 238 62.970 8.430 46.47 80.42
Period 5
ITA 101 108.754 12.505 80.519 134.47
ITABanks 101 159.117 18.927 120.805 209.128
EUBanks 101 98.479 5.744 85.064 109.669
STOXX 101 3407.001 77.467 3194.407 3527.176
VSTOXX 101 14.854 1.999 11.44 21.24
LIQ 101 -0.370 0.001 -0.372 -0.368
OIL 101 76.127 4.146 68.38 85.16
TABLE 4.2: Summary Statistics - Italian Analysis
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in sovereign CDS and daily change in the European banking sector CDS.
j=1,2,3,4,5 refers to the five periods considered and ut is the error term.
In support of the hypothesis that a link between the two credit risks does exist we should find
a statistically and economically significant effect of our explanatory variable of interest ITA-
Banks on the dependent variable or at least an effect of the EUBanks variable, which gave the
effects of the European banking sector.
Results of interest are presented in table 4.3. The whole results of the regression are avail-
able in Appendix A.
LINEAR REGRESSION
Period1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
ITABanks
0.494***
(4.69)
0.679***
(8.46)
0.556***
(11.67)
0.664***
(4.35)
0.913***
(7.40)
EUBanks
0.625**
(2.96)
0.076
(1.61)
0.012
(0.94)
0.021
(0.83)
-0.043
(-1.29)
TABLE 4.3: The table shows the results of the OLS estimation of the model. Only
the two variables of interest are presented with the coeffcient for each period and
the related value of the t-test for the significance of the coefficient.
t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: author’s own evaluation
First, we can see that, as we expected, coefficients of the variable ITABanks are statistically
significant in each period. This is an evidence of the presence of a contagion between the two
credit risks.
In particular starting from the first period we can see that the coefficient of the Italian banking
sector is significant at a 1% level, a 1% change in the daily CDS of Italian banks corresponds to
a 0.49% change in Italian daily sovereign CDS. Here also the coefficient of EUBanks is signifi-
cant meaning that before the start of Monti’s government and more specifically of the sovereign
debt crisis, there was a comovement of the sovereign credit risk with both the domestic banking
sector and the European banking sector.
Starting from the second period with the intensification of the sovereign debt crisis the link be-
came stronger and bigger. During Monti’s government a 1% change in banking daily CDS was
followed by a 0.67% basis points change in sovereign CDS. From this period on the coefficient
of the European banking sector became no more significant so, from the surge of the sovereign
debt crisis, sovereign credit risk became much more connected with the domestic banking sec-
tor and the comovement with the European one stopped.
The coefficient of ITABanks decreased a little in the third period after Monti’s government.
Probably the austerity measures helped to stabilize both CDS and reduce the strength of the
link. During the bailout period in fact the coefficient is still significant but has a slightly lower
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value. A 1% change in Banking CDS causes a 0.55% change in the sovereign ones. EUBanks
coefficient is still not significant.
Probably because of the interventions to rescue the banking sector in the fourth period the co-
efficient is higher (0.66) meaning that, as suggested by the graphical analysis, these operations
caused a transfer of risk from the banking to the sovereign sector reinforcing the link between
the two credit risks. Especially for the recapitalization of Monte dei Paschi in fact government
guarantees played a crucial role and this could have been a factor for the increase in the strenght
of the link.
Finally, in the fifth period after the election of the new government the coefficient is still positive
and statistically significant, a 1% change in daily Banking CDS is followed by a 0.9% change
in sovereign CDS. The contagion is thus still in place and has increased. In this period in fact
because of the proposal of the government to increase the deficit in the sovereign debt to 2.4%
as declared in the "Documento di economia e finanza" and the discussions upon the possibility
of an exit from the monetary union of the country, the spread has increased (300 basis points)
and the trust of international investors has decreased causing a deterioration in the creditworthi-
ness of the country and thus an increase in both CDS series as we saw in the graphical analysis.
These facts could have caused a reinforcement of the link between the two risks with the bank-
ing sector more exposed to changes in sovereign credit risk and vice versa.
In general we can see that the coefficient of the banking sector is statistically and economi-
cally significant in all the five periods meaning that the link between sovereign and banking
credit risk has been in place from the very beginning of the financial crisis, after the Lehman
Brothers default, and it is still in place now.
The link reinforced with the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, decreased after the austerity
measures of the Monti’s government and then increased again after the banks bailout and espe-
cially in the last period after the election of the Conte’s government.
Starting from a value of 0.49 in the first period the coefficient reached a 0.91 in the last one
showing that the link is still in place and is becoming stronger, this could be an element for
the development of the diabolic loop between the sovereign and the banking sector seen in the
previous chapters.
Quantile regression - Theoretical Aspects
The main advantage of using quantile regression is that it is a powerful way to investigate pos-
sible parameters instability. In fact co-movements between variables can be different in crisis
times than in more normal periods. Operations such as banks bailouts or recapitalization happen
during turmoil periods characterized by extreme market conditions so the results found with the
linear regression of our analysis, which covers the sovereign debt crisis and the post phase, can
be biased. Indeed, during periods of turmoil response variables are subject to extremely large
realizations (Caporin et al. 2017).
In our analysis we are interested on the significance and the value of the parameters β1 and β2
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especially before and after some specific economic events. We are interested on changes that
occur to the coefficient and in particular if they are greater or lower before and after the event.
Usually these events have implications on the size and the sign of the shock, the quantile re-
gression allows for a flexible conditioning. It conditions the regression to large, small, positive,
and negative shocks and it is implicitly testing conditional on a large and varied set (Caporin et
al. 2018).
The linear approach estimates are related to the stability of the parameters so this estimation
approach suffers from parameters instability for reasons extraneous to a change in the underly-
ing coefficient. The linear model could in fact suffer from endogeneity, omitted variables bias
or the relationship between the variables could be itself unstable, thus non-linear so that the
transmission of larger shocks could be different from that of lower shocks. In all these cases
the instability of the OLS estimates could be wrongly interpreted in favour of the contagion
between the two risks. Quantile regression is robust to such an error (Caporin et al. 2018).
Quantile regression, which is a non linear approach, allows us to test for different impacts of
the explanatory variables across quantiles of the dependent variable so we can see if the results
of the OLS regression are biased as a consequence of different effects of the variables in the
different quantiles. In order to verify this we simply run some hypothesis test on the coefficient
of different quantiles obtained by the quantile regression estimation.
If we start from a simple model as the one presented by Caporin et al. (2018):
yi,t = βyj,t + wt
where yi,t is the dependent variable, yj,t is our variable of interest and wt represents all the
other lagged control variables of the model. β is the parameter of interest.
The quantile regression evaluate the linear coefficient β conditionals on the different realiza-
tions of yi,t and investigates whether thay are different across those realizations, in particular in
the presence of large or small realizations.
When considering QR, we model the quantiles of the conditional distribution of yi,t, given the
knowledge of yi,t. Second, if the relationship between yi,tand yj,tis estimated as a linear regres-
sion with time invariant innovation term, the relationship for the quantiles is also linear (Caporin
et al. 2018). Precisely, the quantiles will be:
yi,t(τ) = βτ,0 +βτ,1 yj,t + F−1wt (τ)
where βτ,0 is the intercept, τ is the quantile of interest, yi,t(τ) is the τ-quantile of the con-
ditional distribution of yi,t and F−1τ (Wt) is the unconditional quantile of the innovation density.
Of course the coefficients in the linear quantile model are quantile-depedent.
When the model is truly linear for all realizations of yi,t, so the model is truly:
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yi,t = β0 + β1yj,t + wt
for any quantiles of yi,t(τ), then the two coefficients coefficients β will be equal across quan-
tiles. For example β1 of the quantile τ=0.5 will be equal to β1 of the quantile τ=0.9 and thus
equal to β1.
In this case, the regression lines estimated for the different quantiles will just be "parallel" lines
as shown in Figure 4.9
FIGURE 4.9: The figure reports quantile regression lines yi,t(τ) =
βτ,0 +βτ,1 yj,t + F−1wt (τ) when the true underlying model is linear, that is
β1,τ=β1,, or the coefficients does not change across quantiles In the representation
the coefficient is always equal to 0.5, and therefore the slope coefficient of the re-
gression line is always the same across values. The regression line is represented
with the different values of yj,treported in the horizontal axis and the quantile
realizationsyi,t(τ) reported in the vertical axis. The difference among quantiles is
characterized by the intercept F−1τ (Wt) which is the unconditional quantile of the
innovation density (that does depend on the quantile τ). The coefficient β0,τhas
been set equal to 0.
Source: Caporin et al. (2018)
If instead the true underlying model is not linear the quantile estimation lines will became those
in figure 4.10.
In our analysis we thus will perform in particular two different tests on the parameters. First
a "slope equality test" to verify the coefficients stability across quantiles and secondly a "sim-
metry" test to evaluate the slope changes when moving from the left side to the right of the
median.
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FIGURE 4.10: The figure reports quantile regression lines yi,t(τ) =
βτ,0 +βτ,1 yj,t + F−1wt (τ) when the true underlying model is non-linear, that
is β1,τ changes across quantiles In the representation we have β1,0.1=-0.5,
β1,0.25=0.0, β1,0.5 = 0.5, β1,0.75=1, β1,0.9=2. The regression line is represented
with the different values of yj,treported in the horizontal axis and the quantile
realizationsyi,t(τ) reported in the vertical axis. The difference among quantiles is
characterized by the intercept F−1τ (Wt) which is the unconditional quantile of the
innovation density (that does depend on the quantile τ). The coefficient β0,τhas
been set equal to 0.
Source: Caporin et al. (2018)
Quantile Regression Results
As we said before to found further evidences of the results obtained with the OLS regression we
use a quantile regression approach on the same data. The great utility of the quantile regression
is to test for different impacts of the explanatory variables across quantiles of the dependent
variable.
This is useful especially during turmoil periods such as those considered in our analysis. Vari-
ables could indeed be subject to extreme market conditions and reach values distant from the
normal scenario koones causing the linear regression results to be biased. By running some
hypothesis tests on the parameters of different quantiles we can state if in the specific period the
variables present a non linear relationship.
By using quantile regression we hypothesize that a specific quantile of the density of the vari-
able of interest (Italian sovereign CDS changes) is a linear function of a set of covariates.
We thus considered the quantile regression estimation of the previous model, where the esti-
mated parameters are associated with a specific quantile (τ).
This allows to recover the τ-quantile of the dependent variable conditional on the set of the
covariates.
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The model thus is defined as follow:
Qτ(∆ log ITAit) = αij,τ + β
i
j,1,τ∆ log(ITABankst) + β
i
j,2,τ∆ log(EUBankst)
+ βij,3,τ∆ log(STOXXt) + β
i
j,4,τ∆ log(VSTOXXt) +
+ βij,5,τ∆ log(LIQt) + β
i
j,6,τ∆ log(OILt)
Our purpose through the quantile regression is to run two specification tests (Caporin et al.
2017) in order to see if the covariates have different impacts at the different quantile levels of
the dependent variable.
First, we will perform a “slope equality test” to verify the coefficients stability across quan-
tiles. The null hypothesis is the equality of the quantile regression coefficients at the chosen
quantile levels and its rejection suggests that the covariates have different impact at the differ-
ent quantiles of the dependent variable.
In particular we perform our test in three specific quantiles by assigning to τ the values 0.1, 0.5
and 0.9.
Our hypothesis test for the slope equality is:
H0 : β j,10 = β j,50 = β j,90
H1 : H0 rejected
Second, we will evaluate the symmetry of the coefficients by evaluating if their slope changes
when moving from the left side to the right side of the median. Our interest is to see if there are
some asymmetric responses after specific events.
The hypothesis test for the simmetry is:
H0 : β j,10 + β j,90 = 2 ∗ β j,50
H1 : H0 rejected
In the following table are reported the results for the equality slope and the symmetry slope
tests on the two coefficients of interest: ITABanks and EUBanks. Both test have been run on
three tau levels: 10%, 50% and 90%.
From table 4.4 we can see that in Period 1 all the p-values for both the variables are above
5% so we do not reject the null hypothesis. The same can be said for Period 2 and Period 5.
In Period 3 the p-values for the variable of interest ITABanks are quite low for both tests. The
null hypothesis is thus rejected and we can say that the coefficients are not stable so the variable
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ITALY
Slope Equality Simmetry
ITABanks EUBanks ITABanks EUBanks
P1 0.391 0.452 0.172 0.237
P2 0.992 0.287 0.990 0.426
P3 0.098 0.111 0.032 0.037
P4 0.373 0.087 0.215 0.040
P5 0.827 0.938 0.539 0.845
TABLE 4.4: The table shows the p-values of the slope equality and simmetry
tests on the parameters. Tests were made on three different quantiles identified by
τ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
Source: author’s own evaluation
ITABanks has different effects in the three different quantiles of the dependent variable distri-
bution and the slope of the estimation line is different as well. As we saw before, it was a period
of banks bailouts by the government and this could have caused the explanatory variables to
reach more extreme values due to the market conditions. The rejection of the null hypothesis
tells us that in the period the relation between the variables is non linear so the use of the quan-
tile regression which is a non linear approach gives better results. The estimates of the quantile
regression are reported in table 4.5.
QUANTILE REGRESSION P3
[q10] [q50] [q90]
ITABanks
0.556***
(7.50)
0.474***
(11.78)
0.584***
(8.60)
TABLE 4.5: The table shows the results of the quantile estimation of the
model.The coefficient of the variable of interest ITABanks is reported in the three
different quantiles with the corresponding value of the t-test for the significance
of the coefficient. The three quantiles are identified by τ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: author’s own evaluation
As we can see from the table the coefficients are quite different among the three quantiles and
in particular both in the upper and in the lower quantiles the coefficient is higher meaning that
the link between the two credit risks is greater in the upper and lower part of the distribution.
The coefficient of the median quantile (0.474) is also quite different from that obtained through
the linear regression (0.556). We can conclude that the banks bailouts caused a location and
scale shift of the effects of the variable.
In period 4 we find an opposite situation but as we saw from the OLS regression the coeffi-
cient of EUBanks is not statistically significant in that period so the different effects through the
quantiles are not of our interest.
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Finally we can say that the quantile regression analysis gives support to the efficiency and un-
biasness of the linear estimation presented before. In fact as we saw a part from the third period
characterized by high uncertainty in the banking sector due to the rescue of the banks, in the
other periods coefficients seem to have stable effects across quantiles of the dependent variable.
4.5 Germany vs Italy Analysis
We now extend our analysis in order to make a comparison between countries. We decided to
compare Italy and Germany because as we saw they belong to different “categories” identified
by the existent literature. On one hand Germany is considered a core country so it is less ex-
posed to the risk of contagion, on the other side Italy is considered a periphery country and
due to the lower perceived solidity of the country it is more exposed to the contagion and the
possible effects of the loop.
As we saw also from the preliminary general graphical analysis, Germany, despite being the
most powerful economy of the euro area has a banking sector that shows many weaknesses and
this is reflected in the quite high level of banking CDS, while Italy seems to be more risky both
at a country and banking level.
By using the same model as before we conducted a separate analysis for both countries by
dividing the sample period using common economic events at European level. These events are
mainly related to some monetary operations of the ECB:
• PERIOD 1: from 22/10/2008 to 14/05/2010. This period goes from the start of the fi-
nancial crisis to the implementation of the “Securities Markets Programme” of the ECB
through which the ECB made some intervention in the secondary market of some euro
area government bonds. The aim of the program was to reduce interest rates and thus
alleviate the lending activty of the banking sector.
• PERIOD 2: from 17/05/2010 to 31/12/2015. The period goes from the “Securities Mar-
kets Programme” to the entry into force of the second pillar of the Banking Union, the
Single Resolution Mechanism. Within the period there is also the first Outright Monetary
Transaction which caused the end of the Securities Market program.
• PERIOD 3: from 01/01/2016 to 22/10/2018. The periods start with the SRM and ends in
October 2018.
As we made for the Italian case analysis, we now provide a first graphical analysis of the two
series in each of the 3 periods considered. As we already described the graphical evolution for
the Italian case in the previous sections, we now focus on the German case.
The graphical analysis for the Italian case is available in Annex B.
In period 1 (Figure 4.11) we can see that the two trajectories of the lines at the beginning
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are quite different and do not show a quite similar trend. Banks CDS present a quite unstable
path at the beginning while they become more stable from the second part of the period with a
further increase in the very final part.
Sovereign CDS show an increasing trend at the beginning and then a stable trend in the rest
of the period. At the end of the period as for the banking ones there is an unstable path. We
will expect the link between the two risks to be low during the period. The period considered
is in fact antecedent the sovereign debt crisis that could have been a triggering factor for the
comovements of the two CDS.
FIGURE 4.11: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with
5-year maturity for Period 1 in Germany. The blue line represents the sovereign
CDS spreads. The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the
asset weighted average of the CDS spreads of the six German banks within the
selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
At the beginning of the second period (Figure 4.12) we can see that the two lines starts to com-
move more than in the previous period. The banking sector shows a more unstable path but
we can see that generally when there is a surge in the banking sector this also happens in the
sovereign CDS meaning that probably the two risks became more connected during the period.
The increse in both CDS levels is due to the start of the sovereign debt crisis, we can see that
the effects on the banking sector are quite higher with respect to those in the sovereign CDS
that show a quite little increase in their values.
Figure 4.13 is related to the third and final period. Here we can see that sovereign CDS are very
stable along the whole period. In the post crisis period the stability of Germany has increased
muche also as a consequence of the recovery of the economy.
CDS spreads of the banking sector on the contrary show a quite unstable path. At the beginning
4.5. Germany vs Italy Analysis 61
FIGURE 4.12: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with
5-year maturity for Period 2 in Germany. The blue line represents the sovereign
CDS spreads. The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the
asset weighted average of the CDS spreads of the six German banks within the
selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
FIGURE 4.13: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with
5-year maturity for Period 3 in Germany. The blue line represents the sovereign
CDS spreads. The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the
asset weighted average of the CDS spreads of the six German banks within the
selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
we can see a general increasing trend due, as we saw, to the great problems faced by Deutsche
bank which is the greatest banking group in the country. For this reason the CDS of the bank
have a higher weight inside our pool of banks and so the problem faced by the single entity are
reflected in the path of the banks pool CDS.
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At the beginning of 2017 we can clearly see a declining trend until the beginning of 2018. Here
sovereign CDS remain very stable but the banks CDS start to increase again thus reflecting the
weaknesses of the German banking sector.
If we compare what we have seen until now for Germany with the Italian situation we can
clearly see that the two lines show a more evident common path in Italy than in Germany. This
suggests that probably with the empirical analysis the coefficients will be lower for Germany
indicating that the dimension of the contagion is lower with respect to Italy.
We now continue with the empirical results.
4.5.1 Summary Statistics
In the previous section we analyzed the data from a graphical point of view, now we provide a
summary statistics for the data of each period selected for the analysis. Results are presented in
table 4.5, we report only the variables of interest for the econometric analysis.
We have 2609 observations for each of the variables. In particular there are 408 observations
for the first period, 1469 for the second one, and 732 for the last period.
If we look at the numbers we can see that Italian sovereign CDS average value is higher in
the second period while German sovereign CDS has a greater median in the first one. In the
German case tha average sovereign CDS is indeed decreasing across the three periods.
For what concerns the banking CDS the two countries seem quite similar. We find the greatest
average value in the second period while the average value is quite lower in the other two
periods. Especially in Germany the mean of the last period is quite similar to that of the first
period so bank CDS seem to have returned to the pre-soveregn debt crisis values after the
implementation of the ECB monetary policy measures. For Italy instead the mean in the last
period is higher with respect to that of the first one.
In general we can say that by looking at the numbers we can clearly see tha great difference in
the risk of the two countries with Italy much riskier both in the sovereign and in the banking
sector.
4.5.2 Empirical Analysis
As we did for the Italian case alone we now provide an empirical estimation to find evidences of
the contagion between sovereign and banking credit risk that we found in the graphical analysis.
Our purpose is that of making a comparison between the two countries in term of percentage
change of the coefficients of interest between the periods selected.
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Period 1 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ITA 408 107.092 39.433 48 219.959
ITABanks 408 101.717 33.638 60.048 230.556
GER 408 36.905 15.888 20 92.5
GERBanks 408 107.757 18.294 77.816 160.668
EUBanks 408 195.163 54.23246 123.136 336.7
STOXX 408 2589.469 294.936 1809.98 3017.85
VSTOXX 408 34.431 11.929 19.8 76.54
LIQ 408 -.332 .333 -.675 .863
OIL 408 63.925 14.166 33.73 88.09
Period 2
ITA 1,469 187.117 107.828 69.25 498.659
ITABanks 1,469 238.178 133.961 85.485 642.191
GER 1,469 23.398 16.019 6.64 79.289
GERBanks 1,469 123.047 48.770 61.135 321.76
EUBanks 1,469 250.800 117.3743 90.227 552.179
STOXX 1,469 2866.058 400.4552 1995.011 3828.784
VSTOXX 1,469 23.524 6.893 12.71 53.55
LIQ 1,469 -.252 .232 -.777 .192
OIL 1,469 94.700 23.690 35.26 128.14
Period 3
ITA 732 92.415 25.304 42.039 140.5
ITABanks 732 145.985 48.432 51.308 250.413
GER 732 8.523 3.283 5.000 15.56
GERBanks 732 104.222 33.589 51.335 193.483
EUBanks 732 119.254 39.928 41.121 229.959
STOXX 732 3305.982 248.468 2680.351 3697.4
VSTOXX 732 18.117 5.661 10.68 39.9
LIQ 732 -.362 .0221 -.375 -.255
OIL 732 55.556 12.955 26.01 84.94
TABLE 4.6: Summary Statistics - Comparison Analysis
Linear Regression
The two models used for the two countries are the same as the one used for the Italian case. The
only difference is the division of the data window. We set as dependent variable the sovereign
CDS and as explanatory variables domestic Banking sector CDS, European Banking sector
CDS and the control variables already presented.
The two models are the following respectively for Italy and Germany:
∆ log(ITAit) = αi + βij,1∆ log(ITABankst)+ β
i
j,2∆ log(EUBankst)+ β
i
j,3∆ log(STOXXt)+
βij,4∆ log(VSTOXXt) + β
i
j,5∆ log(LIQt) + β
i
j,6∆ log(OILt) + ut
∆ log(GERit) = αi + βij,1∆ log(GERBankst)+ β
i
j,2∆ log(EUBankst)+ β
i
j,3∆ log(STOXXt)+
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βij,4∆ log(VSTOXXt) + β
i
j,5∆ log(LIQt) + β
i
j,6∆ log(OILt) + ut
As we did before we start from the linear estimation of the two models, Table 4.6 and 4.7
show the results respectively for Italy and Germany.
LINEAR REGRESSION ITALY
Period1 Period 2 Period 3
ITABanks
-0.011
(-0.08)
0.812***
(19.15)
0.568***
(6.36)
EUBanks
1.844***
(4.89)
0.015
(1.23)
0.014
(0.70)
TABLE 4.7: The table shows the results of the OLS estimation of the model
for the Italian case. Only the two variables of interest are presented with the
coefficient for each period and the related value of the t-test for the significance
of the coefficient.
t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: author’s own evaluation
LINEAR REGRESSION GERMANY
Period1 Period 2 Period 3
GERBanks
0.165
(1.55)
0.502***
(7.32)
0.421**
(2.61)
EUBanks
1.406***
(7.28)
0.09**
(3.05)
-0.06
(-1.35)
TABLE 4.8: The table shows the results of the OLS estimation of the model
for the German case. Only the two variables of interest are presented with the
coefficient for each period and the related value of the t-test for the significance
of the coefficient.
t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: author’s own evaluation
What we can easily notice from the estimation results is that the two countries have a quite com-
mon situation for what concern the comovement between sovereign CDS and domestic banks
CDS. The coefficient is in fact non significant in Period 1 while it became positive and statisti-
cally significant in the other two periods.
We can see that in general coefficients are lower for Germany meaning that the contagion is
less pronounced here with respect to Italy. We should have expected this since, as we saw from
the graphical analysis, German sovereign CDS are very stable across the data window and the
comovement between the two CDS series is less evident in the country.
In period 1, prior to the beginning of the Securities Market Program and the European sovereign
debt crisis, the coefficient of the domestic banking sector for both countries is not statistically
significant while the coefficient of EUBanks is on the opposite positive and significant. More
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specifically respectively for Italy and Germany a 1% increase in daily change in European bank-
ing CDS is followed by a 1.8% and a 1.4% increase in daily change of sovereign CDS.
This suggests that prior to the sovereign debt crisis a contagion was in place only between the
sovereign and the European-banking sector. This means that probably the sovereign CDS were
more exposed to changes in the systemic component of the risk rather than of the country spe-
cific component.
As we said before the situation changes in the following periods. In period 2 both coefficients
of the domestic banking sector became positive and statistically significant. In Germany the
European banking sector coefficient is still positive and statistically significant but it is lower
with respect to the previous period, the link with the European banking sector is still in place. In
Italy the coefficient is not statistically significant. A 1% increase in daily change of the doemstic
banking sector is followed by a 0.8% increase in daily change for Italy and a 0.5% daily change
for Germany in the sovereign CDS.
In the last period, after the introduction of the Single Resolution Mechanism, the situation is
similar to that of period 2. The coefficient of the domestic banking sector is still positive and
statistically significant but the value is lower with respect to the previous periods for both coun-
tries. In Italy the coefficient is 0.56 while it was 0.8 in the previous period and for Germany the
coefficient is 0.42 while it was 0.50 previously.
What we can say in the end is that the link in the two countries presented a quite similar be-
haviour. Prior to the start of the sovereign debt crisis and the "securities market program" the
contagion was at a European level while after sovereign credit risk became much more con-
nected with the domestic banking sector. The link was stronger during the second period con-
sidered while it seems to have been attenuated after the introduction of the Single Resolution
Mechanism.
A better comparison can be made by looking at the percentage change of the coefficients be-
tween the periods. In particular from period 2 to period 3 the coefficient of the domestic banking
sector has decreased of 30% in Italy and of 16% in Germany so the policy measures of the ECB
were more effective in Italy. We could expect this since the non conventional measure of mon-
etary policy made by the ECB were addressed especially to those countries that were more hit
by the crisis and Italy was one of this.
Quantile regression
As we did for the Italian case analysis we now try to find stronger evidences of what we found
with the OLS regression by using the quantile regression. In particular we look if the relation-
ship between the variables is a linear one or not.
As we done before we will perform the slope equality and the simmetry test of the coefficients
for both countries in order to find if the covariates have different effects in the diffrerent quan-
tiles of the dependent variable.
The null hypothesis are the same as before for both the tests.
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First we rewrite the two models as follow:
Qτ(∆ log ITAit) = αij,τ + β
i
j,1,τ∆ log(ITABankst) + β
i
j,2,τ∆ log(EUBankst)
+ βij,3,τ∆ log(STOXXt) + β
i
j,4,τ∆ log(VSTOXXt) +
+ βij,5,τ∆ log(LIQt) + β
i
j,6,τ∆ log(OILt)
Qτ(∆ logGERit) = αij,τ + β
i
j,1,τ∆ log(GERBankst) + β
i
j,2,τ∆ log(EUBankst)
+ βij,3,τ∆ log(STOXXt) + β
i
j,4,τ∆ log(VSTOXXt) +
+ βij,5,τ∆ log(LIQt) + β
i
j,6,τ∆ log(OILt)
We now present the results of the tests on the parameters (Table 4.7 and 4.8).
ITALY
Slope Equality Simmetry
ITABanks EUBanks ITABanks EUBanks
P1 0.249 0.385 0.494 0.247
P2 0.091 0.183 0.554 0.093
P3 0.243 0.403 0.093 0.178
TABLE 4.9: The table shows the p-values of the slope equality and simmetry
tests on the parameters. Tests were made on three different quantiles identified by
τ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
Source: author’s own evaluation
GERMANY
Slope Equality Simmetry
GERBanks EUBanks GERBanks EUBanks
P1 0.910 0.006 0.983 0.003
P2 0.208 0.270 0.119 0.883
TABLE 4.10: The table shows the p-values of the slope equality and simmetry
tests on the parameters. Tests were made on three different quantiles identified by
τ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
Source: author’s own evaluation
From the tables we can see that for the Italian case the p-values of the domestic banking sector
for both tests are above a 5% and this provides evidences in favour of the unbias of the linear
regression results.
The European banking sector coefficients instead are high enough to not reject the null hypoth-
esis at a 95% level for both test in all the three periods.
If we look ate the quantile regression results for period 3 we can see in fact that
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In general parameters show to be stable across quantiles giving more evidence on the signifi-
cance of the linear regression estimates made in the previous section.
For what concerns Germany it was not possible to run the tests for the last period because of the
presence of many null values in the logarithm of the daily change in German sovereign bonds.
However in the first two periods we can see that the p-value of both test performed on GER-
banks coefficient are above 5% so we do not reject the null hypothesis.
For the European banking sector instead, in Period 1 the variable seemed to have had different
impacts at the different quantiles. We will thus report the results of the quantile regression for
the three quantiles in Period 1 (Table 4.11).
QUANTILE REGRESSION P1
[q10] [q50] [q90]
EUBanks
1.50***
(3.61)
0.95***
(4.93)
1.81***
(5.96)
TABLE 4.11: The table shows the results of the quantile estimation of the
model.The coefficient of the variable of interest EUBanks is reported in the three
different quantiles with the corresponding value of the t-test for the significance
of the coefficient. The three quantiles are identified by τ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9
t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: author’s own evaluation
From the table we can see that the effects of the variable ITABanks have been quite different in
the three quantiles and especially they are greater in the upper part of the distribution.
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Conclusions
As a consequence of the financial turmoil caused by the events of the financial crisis of 2008,
many European countries were forced to rescue their troubled domestic banking sectors. This
has caused a transfer of risk from the banking sector to the sovereign and thus created a link
between sovereign and banking credit risk. A change in one of the two risks is mirrored by a
consequent change in the other one.
The transfer of risk and the contagion between the credit risks can be a triggering factor for the
development of the so called "diabolic loop", a negative feedback loop that originating from
the reducing creditworthiness of the sovereign cause problems to the activity of the domestic
banking sector and thus reduces the stimulus to the real economy, as seen in chapter 1. The
reduction in the creditworthiness cane be easily captured by the level of the CDS on sovereign
and banking bonds which measure the credit risk of both entities.
In order to study the presence of such a link in Italy we decided therefore to use 5Y CDS
in order to conduct an empirical analysis. We decided to look at the contagion from the side
that goes from the banking sector to the sovereign.
First we focused our attention on Italy and in particular we found that the contagion was in place
since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 and is still in place today. The implementation
of the austerity measures of the Monti’s government seemed to have lower the dimension of the
link but the following rescue operations made in the banking sector during 2016 and 2017 raised
the connection between the two risks. Finally in the light of the very recent political events of
the country after the election of the new government we decided to see also if something has
happened to the link after the elections. We indeed found that the political instability caused by
the new government and the collision between the economical decision of the government and
the guide lines given by the European Union, which have caused the increase in both sovereign
and banks CDS, have increased the interconnection between the two risks thus giving greater
exposure to the possible effects of the feedback loop to the country.
After the country level analysis we made a comparison between Italy and Germany. We di-
vided the data window in three periods, the first one is prior to the sovereign debt crisis, the
second one includes the development of the non conventional monetary policies of the ECB
and the third goes from the implementation of the Quantitative Easing to the recent days.
We found a quite common behaviour of the link in both countries, in fact prior to the sovereign
debt crisis a link is in place but not between the sovereign and the domestic banking sector
but between the sovereign and the European banking sector. Probably as a consequence of the
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increase in the domestic exposures of the domestic banking sectors in the two countries in the
following two periods the link became quite evident. However we can see that the non conven-
tional monetary policies of the ECB seemed to have reduced the link but it has not disappeared.
The contagion thus is not only a matter of weak countries like Italy which has high public debt,
low GDP growth and a weak banking sector. As we saw also countries like Germany which
have one of the strongest economies in the Euro Area show the presence of the contagion.
The effects that the persistence of the contagion could have on the whole economy of a country
has been highlighted in Chapter 1. As long as the sovereign and the banking sector remain
interconnected shocks that increase the risk related with one of the two cause an effect on the
risk of the other and this is reflected in lower stimulus to the real economy.
Policy makers must be concerned about this when taking economic policy decisions. Every
choice made at a country level which causes a decrease in the trust of international investors
and thus increases the credit risk of the country does not remain limited to the sovereign itself
but today is also reflected in the banking sector and thus to the real economy through the lending
activity which is so important for firms.
Crucial will be in the future the attempts to try to reduce and eliminate the contagion especially
at the European level. Many solutions have been suggested and were presented in Chapter 3
and they should be the starting point for a concrete intervention in order to mitigate the effects
of the loop. As we saw in the analysis the interventions made by the ECB in order to make the
European banking sector more integrated and stronger seemed to have weaken the effects of the
loop. However the contagion is still in place and its effects still represent huge problems for the
recovery of European countries.
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Appendix A
Regressions Results
In this section we report the whole results of the linear regressions made in the analysis.
First of all we present those of the Italian case analysis and then that of the comparison analysis.
FIGURE A.1: The figure shows the results of the linear regression for the Italian
case alone. All the control variables are reported.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
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FIGURE A.2: The figure shows the results of the linear regression for the Italian
case in the comparison analysis. All the control variables are reported.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
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FIGURE A.3: The figure shows the results of the linear regression for the German
case in the comparison analysis. All the control variables are reported.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
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Appendix B
Italy - Graphical Analysis
In this section we provide the graphical analysis for the Italian case in the comparison analysis.
We will study the evolution of the the two CDS series from a graphical point of view in ache of
the three periods considered in the analysis.
FIGURE B.1: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with
5-year maturity for Period 1. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
In period 1 we can see that the two series comove especially in the central part. Differences in
the pattern can be seen at the beginning and at the end of the period. There the sovereign credit
risk is greater than the banking one.
In both cases we can see thta the sovereign risk has increased but was not followed by a simoul-
taneous increase also in the banking risk.
We can imagine that here the link between the two risks is quite low.
In period 2 we can see that the two lines overlap at the beginning of the period and comove
for the rest of the period. Both CDS levels increase in 2011 with because of the start of the
sovereign debt crisis and remain quite high until the end of 2013. As we saw in the singular
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FIGURE B.2: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with
5-year maturity for Period 2. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
FIGURE B.3: The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with
5-year maturity for Period 3. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS spreads.
The red line represents the banks CDS which are computed as the asset weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the six Italian banks within the selected pool.
Source: Author’s own evaluation
country analysis during these phase the country experienced the worst consequences of the fi-
nancial crisis with the spread reaching 500 points. From 2014 both CDS levels start to decrease
and we can notice that this is more pronounced for the banking sector ones.The two lines over-
lap each other at the end of 2014 and then while sovereign CDS remain quite stable, the banking
one start to increase again.
We will expect the link between the two risks to have became more stronger with respect to the
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previous period.
Finally, in the last period (figure B.3) we can see that the the two series have a great comove-
ment at the beginning and a quite stable and then declining trend especially for the banking
CDS.
At the end of the period especially starting from march 2018 when the political instability after
the elections hit the country, both CDS series start to rise and comove.
As for the previous period we expect the link between the two credit risks to be still in place.
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